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FOUR EASY PIECES TO BALANCE 
PRIVACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION: 
A RESPONSE TO WRONGDOING 
RANGING FROM PETTY CORRUPTION TO 
THE SANDUSKY AND PENN STATE TRAGEDY 
Robert Steinbuch* 
This Article offers four legislative solutions—four easy pieces—to 
properly balance confidentiality and accountability in publicly financed 
higher education. It presents (1) a fix to the Federal Student Privacy 
Act that will prevent it from being misapplied as a defense to proper 
freedom of information act requests, (2) a bill to require the affirmative 
disclosure of admission practices at public schools receiving federal 
funding, (3) a bill that imposes direct costs, through the bankruptcy 
code, on schools that misrepresent their data regarding graduation and 
post-graduation opportunities, and (4) a revision of the federal freedom 
of information act to have it apply to those public schools that receive 
federal funding. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The worst scandal in the history of college athletics, involving 
charges of serial child rape and systemic covering up,”1 might not 
have reached the compounding calamity that it has had Penn State 
been subject to the proper—and elsewhere commonplace—open 
government laws. 
As is now well known, the former defensive coach for Penn 
State’s football team, Jerry Sandusky, has been convicted of sexually 
abusing ten boys.2 Gary Schultz, Penn State’s senior vice president 
for finance and business, and Tim Curley, its athletic director, were 
also charged with perjury and failure to report the allegations to 
authorities.3 At the time of the initial exposure of the allegations 
against Sandusky, Penn State’s then-president, Graham B. Spanier, 
said that he stood behind these two officials.4 Shortly thereafter, the 
university fired him, as well as its renowned head football coach, Joe 
Paterno.5 
Much of the fallout from the Sandusky affair resulted from the 
fact that for nine years the allegations of child rape against Sandusky, 
and the university’s tepid response thereto, remained shielded from 
public scrutiny. Many properly asked how this could be. The 
unfortunate answer is that 
[t]he public’s right to know how the university dealt with 
the allegations . . . [was] restricted by a [specific] provision 
in [Pennsylvania’s] [freedom of information] law that was 
strongly supported by the same university officials who 
ignored all [the] danger signs in the Sandusky case. . . . [In 
fact,] the former president of Penn State[,] who was 
dismissed earlier this month, argued aggressively for the 
exemption [to the state’s new law] back in 2007, declaring 
 
 1. Michael Bérubé, Op-Ed., At Penn State, a Bitter Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/opinion/at-penn-state-a-bitter-reckoning.html. 
 2. Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 Years For Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at 
A1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 4. 
 5. Mark Viera, Paterno Ousted with President by Penn State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, 
at A1. 
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[that the school] needed to protect donor information, 
intellectual property rights and deals that the university 
struck with companies it spins off.6 
Unfortunately, serving the asserted “need[] to protect donor 
information, intellectual property rights and deals that the university 
struck with companies it spins off”7 also brought about the all-too-
predictable—indeed, the likely intended—result of protecting the 
institution’s “good name,” and, sure enough, that of its 
administrators, by refusing to come clean with the embarrassing 
details of school-related wrongdoing. 
Indeed, details since disclosed suggest documentation that 
would be subject to freedom of information act requests in states 
with more rigorous openness laws could have been revealed far 
earlier in Pennsylvania had it embraced a greater fidelity to true 
transparency: 
The university’s much maligned handling of the 2001 
assault began when Mike McQueary, a graduate assistant in 
Paterno’s football program, told Paterno that he had seen 
Sandusky assaulting a boy of about 10 in the football 
building showers. McQueary has testified several times that 
he made clear to Paterno, and later to university officials, 
that what he had seen Sandusky doing to the child was 
terrible and explicitly sexual in nature. 
To date, the public understanding of Paterno’s 
subsequent actions has been that he relayed McQueary’s 
account to the university’s athletic director and then had no 
further involvement in the matter. 
But the e-mails uncovered by investigators working for 
Louis J. Freeh, the former F.B.I. director leading an 
independent investigation ordered by the university’s board 
of trustees, suggest that the question of what to do about 
McQueary’s report was extensively debated by university 
officials. Those officials, the e-mails show, included the 
university’s president, Graham B. Spanier; the athletic 
 
 6. Editorial, Open the Records at Penn State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.ny 
times.com/2011/11/17/opinion/open-the-records-at-penn-state.html (emphasis added). 
 7. Id. (emphasis added). 
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director, Tim Curley; the official in charge of the campus 
police, Gary Schultz; and Paterno.8 
In affirmatively advocating against having the open-government 
law cover his own institution, Graham B. Spanier said, “Nobody 
would argue the point that the public has a right to know how public 
funds are spent, . . . [b]ut these proposals [of applying openness laws 
to Penn State] will fundamentally change the way we operate, the 
way our trustees govern, and the way the university administers [its] 
policies.”9 Spanier was correct in his assessment that Penn State 
would have to operate differently under a regime of open 
government, but his implied conclusion that open-government law 
should not apply to Penn State was utterly misguided. Thus, in a 
spectacular display of academic hypocrisy, this university 
administrator supported public access to governmental records for 
others but refused to effectuate this laudable goal at his own 
institution. Indeed, this ingrained sense of secrecy, even in the face 
of these appalling events, seems hard to shed: “[Although current] 
President Rodney A. Erickson of Pennsylvania State University told 
an alumni crowd . . . that ‘openness and communication’ would be 
the guiding principles of his tenure . . . his measured responses to 
audience questions . . . made clear that candidness has its 
limits . . . .”10 
President Spanier’s hypocrisy turned to irony when, during the 
investigation surrounding the Sandusky affair, Spanier sued his 
former institution to obtain his old e-mails, which, inter alia, were 
being used in the investigation.11 Spanier, however, did not sue under 
Pennsylvania’s freedom of information act, even though such 
material would be routinely accessible under many state freedom of 
 
 8. Jo Becker, E-Mails Suggest Paterno Role in Silence on Sandusky, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/sports/ncaafootball/paterno-may-have-influenced 
-decision-not-to-report-sandusky-e-mails-indicate.html?_r=1. 
 9.  Pennsylvania's New Right to Know Law, Act 3 of 2008: Hearing Before the House State 
Gov't Comm., 2007–2008 Sess. (Pa. 2007) (written testimony of Graham B. Spanier, President, 
Pa. State Univ.), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/TR/transcripts/2007_0189 
_0011_TSTMNY.pdf. 
 10. Don Troop, Few Revelations at Pittsburgh Meeting With Penn State's President, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., (Jan. 12, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Few-Revelations-at-Pittsburgh 
/130297 (emphasis added). 
 11. Complaint, Spanier v. Pa. State Univ., No. 2012-2065 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. filed May 24, 
2012), available at http://www.co.centre.pa.us/media/upload/SPANIER%20Complaint.pdf. 
  
168 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:163 
 
information laws.12 Rather, Spanier sued under far less applicable 
theories of replevin and mandamus.13 The sublime turned to the 
ridiculous when Penn State, in its response to Spanier, averred that 
Spanier should seek the documents pursuant to Pennsylvania’s 
Right-to-Know Law, i.e., its freedom of information act.14 
Examples such as this show that, absent legal compulsion, 
school administrators are too often wont to disclose bad news 
concerning their institutions or its officials—notwithstanding  
oft-stated claims of fidelity to openness. 
“The university completely abdicated its role as an 
educational institution committed to the public good in 
order to protect its corporate brand, image, and market 
value,” said Michael D. Giardina, an assistant professor of 
sport management and associate director of the Center for 
Physical Cultural Studies at Florida State University. “The 
outrage over this case is certainly justified, and we should 
encourage greater degrees of transparency and 
accountability in our institutions. 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 5–7. 
 14. Preliminary Objections of Defendant at 6–8, Spanier v. Pa. State Univ., No. 2012-2065 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. filed May 24, 2012), available at http://www.co.centre.pa.us/media/upload 
/SPANIER%20defendants%20pos.pdf. For discussions of similar issues, see Robert Steinbuch, 
Looking Through the Class and What Alice Found There: A Frustrated Analysis of Law School 
Admissions Policies and Practices, 14 SCHOLAR 61, 68 (2011). Other university administrators, 
such as John Miller, president of Central Connecticut State University, have adopted positions 
similar to Spainer’s. See id. at 105 n.5. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mr. Miller previously faced 
criticism from the Foundation for Individual Rights in Higher Education (FIRE) in 2007: 
FIRE is concerned about the threat to free speech posed by your announcement on 
September 14, 2007, urging “oversight boards” to “look further into making 
substantive, constructive changes” to the CCSU student paper, the Recorder, and 
suggesting the possibility of instituting a mandatory “cultural awareness” requirement. 
Also, we are aware that some members of the campus community are urging CCSU to 
sanction—and even suspend—the Recorder’s staff because of a controversial cartoon 
published in the paper on September 12. Before the university takes further action 
against the students or the paper, FIRE would like to warn CCSU about the 
university’s constitutional obligation to protect students’ First Amendment rights. As 
Carolyn A. Magnan, Counsel to the President, correctly stated, “the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution protects most student speech in The Recorder from 
interference by the University.” 
Letter from FIRE to John Miller, President, Cent. Conn. State Univ. (Sept. 20, 2007), 
http://thefire.org/article/8420.html. 
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“At the same time,” he continued, “we shouldn’t 
overlook or forget that the corporate university of today 
makes ethically suspect decisions all the time.”15 
Even with statutory mandates, compliance is far from 
guaranteed. For further example of the ethically suspect decisions, in 
responding to what was ultimately adjudged by the Public Access 
Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General as a valid Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request by the Chicago Tribune, Chicago 
State University officials readily admitted that they were refusing to 
turn over (public) documents because, inter alia, 
[given] the number of hostile and negative articles that [the 
Chicago Tribune reporter] has written about Chicago State 
University, its students, faculty and administrators, the 
University asserts that it would be an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy to release any of the names of 
individuals requested by the Tribune. * * * A reasonable 
person would find the use of his or her name published in 
association with one of the Tribune’s negative articles 
highly objectionable.16 
In other words, school officials expressly conceded that they 
refused to respond to a valid FOIA request because they did not like 
the newspaper’s coverage of their university. 
Such institutional duplicity affects all Americans—both morally 
and financially—because all public institutions of higher education, 
like Penn State, receive significant federal funding.17 For example, 
“Pennsylvania students received $3.5 billion in federal direct student 
loans in 2010, more than doubling 1.5 billion received in 2009.”18 
 
 15. Brad Wolverton, Penn State's Culture of Reverence Led to 'Total Disregard' for 
Children's Safety, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 12, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Penn 
-States-Culture-of/132853/?cid=wb&utm_source=wb&utm_medium=en. 
 16. In re FOIA, Ill. Public Access Opinion No. 12-003 (Jan. 18, 2012) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Letter from Patrick B. Cage, Gen. Counsel, Chi. State Univ., to Sarah Pratt, Acting Pub. 
Access Counselor, Office of the Ill. Attorney Gen. (Aug. 23, 2011)), available at 
http://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/opinions/2012/12-003.pdf. 
 17. See Pete Kasperowicz, In Wake of Penn State Scandal, Bill Would Suspend Federal 
Funds, THE HILL’S FLOOR ACTION BLOG, (Nov. 14, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs 
/floor-action/house/193557-dem-responds-to-penn-state-with-bill-to-cut-federal-funds?page=3. 
 18. PA. STATE DATA CTR., RESEARCH BRIEF: PENNSYLVANIA RECEIVES $145.9 BILLION IN 
FEDERAL FUNDS, 5TH HIGHEST IN NATION (2011), available at http://pasdc.hbg.psu.edu/sdc 
/pasdc_files/researchbriefs/CFFR%202010_RB.pdf. 
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[And around $17 billion of federal money] flows to private 
institutions, and has since World War II. . . . Federal student 
aid is spread even farther afield, following students 
wherever they go, to public and private nonprofits, from 
Berkeley to Harvard, as well as to private for-profits like 
the University of Phoenix and DeVry University, where by 
law up to 90 percent of their revenues may derive from 
student aid. Which is to say that while the combination of 
funds differs at different institutions, the bottom line 
doesn’t change: American higher education is still publicly 
supported, even at supposedly “private” institutions, and 
most of the country’s 4,400 colleges and 18 million students 
could not survive without it.19 
While bad state laws, confusion about the law, and institutional 
intransigence and concealment have dramatically impeded sunshine-
in-government efforts, these are not the only problems faced by 
citizens seeking more information from public institutions of higher 
learning. The intersection of state FOIAs and federal law has 
provided additional roadblocks to open government. 
For example, in May 2009, the Chicago Tribune began a series 
about admission practices at the University of Illinois, which 
discussed the university’s preferential admission of relatives of 
influential people.20 The Tribune sought to determine “whether the 
admissions policies of the publicly supported University of Illinois 
are infected by political influence.”21 The Tribune aptly noted that 
this inquiry is the archetype of “a matter of obvious public interest. It 
bears on the power and purse of the State and the duties of public 
servants. The public has a right to ‘know[] how its tax dollars are 
being spent.’”22 This argument gains further momentum when 
viewed in light of the knowledge that “80% of the country’s  
 
 19. Christopher P. Loss, Commentary, Why the Morrill Land-Grant Colleges Act Still 
Matters, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 16, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Why-the-Morrill 
-Act-Still/132877/?cid=wb&utm_source=wb&utm_medium=en. 
 20. Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2011), 
vacated on other grounds, 680 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Chi. Tribune 
Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 10 C 0568), 2010 WL 
3354327, at *1 (alteration in original) (quoting Family Life League v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 493 
N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ill. 1986)). 
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college-age students attend[] public universities,” and, in 2008, for 
example, states spent over $80 billion on higher education.23 
The Tribune sought these public records under Illinois’s 
Freedom of Information Act.24 “In refusing the Request, the 
University invoked FERPA [the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act] and asserted a FOIA exemption for information 
‘specifically prohibited from disclosure’ under state or federal 
law.”25 FERPA ties federal educational funding to those schools that 
have policies for maintaining student privacy.26 FERPA also 
provides that student records may be released to the public if 
students’ personally identifying information is removed.27 
FERPA is neither an access statute like the FOIA nor a bar to 
them, but as the Tribune case shows, schools have used it as the 
latter. As the Tribune stated (and as discussed below), 
By its own terms, nothing in FERPA prohibits disclosure of 
the public records Tribune seeks. FERPA was not intended 
to shroud in secrecy public records that have nothing to do 
with the academic and educationally-related information 
that the statute was intended to protect, and everything to do 
with political favors and official privilege.28 
Indeed, the excessively reflexive opposition to requests for 
public information from taxpayer-funded educational institutions has 
been noted by a state attorney general in the very jurisdiction 
housing those often-intransigent school officials.29 For example, in 
 
 23. Alison Damast, State Universities Brace for Another Brutal Year, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bschools 
/content/feb2010/bs20100211_635552.htm. 
 24. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 (2005). 
 25. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22. 
 26. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006); Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 65. 
 27. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2012); Letter from LeRoy S. Rooker, Dir., 
FPCO, to Matthew J. Pepper, Policy Analyst, Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. (Nov. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/library/nashville_tn2004.html; Steinbuch, supra 
note 14, at 65. 
 28. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 22,  
at 3–4. 
 29. A related device by public universities for attempting to avoid FOIA application has 
been the funneling of funds through foundations. These foundations are private entities that 
collect funds on behalf of public educational entities. Schools with foundations often have 
attempted to thread the needle of FOIA applicability by claiming that the nominally private nature 
of the foundations should protect them from public scrutiny. This argument has met mixed 
results. See N. Cent. Ass’n of Colls. & Sch. v. Troutt Bros., Inc., 548 S.W.2d 825, 826–27 (Ark. 
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an Illinois case different than the one discussed above, a 
spokesperson for the Illinois Attorney General lamented the culture 
of secrecy embodied in the University of Illinois–Springfield’s 
FERPA-based resistance to a request for public information: “Prior 
to the enactment of the new FOIA laws . . . this information would 
never have been made public.”30 Notwithstanding this apt criticism, 
the almost instinctive reference to FERPA by many educational 
administrators in response to FOIA requests is perhaps somewhat 
foreseeable from a psychological perspective: because FERPA 
undoubtedly has a legitimate purpose of protecting student privacy, 
administrators sometimes see their actions as motivated by this goal, 
rather than their own personal interests.31 
 
1977) (holding that a private foundation was subject to the FOIA where its chairman was 
employed by the Arkansas Department of Education, the chairman’s secretary performed certain 
services for the foundation, over 90 percent of the school-provided funding was public money, 
and the foundation was on public property); Cal. State Univ. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
870, 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a nongovernmental auxiliary organization is not a 
“state agency” for purposes of the FOIA and interpreting the California Public Records Act, 
which is the state law modeled after the FOIA); State ex rel. Guste v. Nicholls Coll. Found., 592 
So. 2d 419, 424 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a university foundation’s use of public funds 
alone did not make it subject to Louisiana’s public records law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:1 
(2012)); Jackson v. E. Mich. Univ. Found., 544 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 
(rejecting school’s claim that foundation is not a public body as defined by the FOIA because it is 
primarily funded by the school); State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Found., 602 
N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a private nonprofit corporation that acts as a major 
gift-receiving and soliciting arm of a public university and receives support from public taxation 
is subject to the FOIA, and stating that “[t]he record shows that the foundation is not a mere 
supplementary benefactor of the university. It is a major gift-receiving and soliciting entity of the 
university, and its transaction records do document its activities”); Weston v. Carolina Research 
and Dev. Found., 401 S.E.2d 161, 164 (S.C. 1991) (holding that “the unambiguous language of 
the FOIA mandates that the receipt of support in whole or in part from public funds brings a 
corporation within the definition of a public body”); 4-H Rd. Cmty. Ass’n v. W. Va. Univ. 
Found., 388 S.E.2d 308, 312 (W. Va. 1989) (affirming that the private, not-for-profit foundation 
corporation created for the purpose of assisting the university, primarily through fundraising, is 
not a “public body” subject to the FOIA). 
 30. Bruce Rushton, UIS Continues to Resist Disclosure of Coaches' Conduct, ST. J.-REG., 
Mar. 17, 2011, at 1 (omission in original) (quoting Natalie Bauer, Communications Director for 
the Illinois Attorney General), available at http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1777814658/UIS 
-continues-to-resist-disclosure-of-coaches-conduct. 
 31. See RONALD C. NASO, HYPOCRISY UNMASKED: DISSOCIATION, SHAME, AND THE 
ETHICS OF INAUTHENTICITY 26 (2010) (“[W]hen behavior conflicts with moral standards, it is the 
latter rather than the former that are likely to change. This finding is completely consistent with 
almost fifty years of research on cognitive dissonance. Rather than changing their behavior, 
participants reinterpreted their self-interests as moral.”). 
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In this article, I offer four legislative solutions—four easy 
pieces32—to “restore” (or, more likely, create) the proper balance 
between confidentiality and accountability in publicly financed 
higher education. In fact, this article began as a response to a request 
from the office of a United States Senator—aware of my previous 
research in this field33—for draft legislation on these issues. I present 
(1) a FERPA fix; (2) a bill to require the affirmative disclosure of 
admission practices at public schools receiving federal funding; (3) a 
bill that imposes direct costs, through the bankruptcy code, on 
schools that misrepresent their data regarding graduation and 
postgraduation opportunities; and (4) a revision of the federal FOIA 
to have it apply to those public schools that receive federal funding. 
These legislative solutions will not only allow academics and 
others to pursue important research while properly protecting 
individual privacy, but more importantly, these four easy pieces will 
provide for greater public oversight of taxpayer-funded institutions. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Metropolis’s Savior: 
State Freedom of Information Acts 
At its core, participatory democracy decries locked files and 
closed doors. Good citizens study their governors, challenge 
the decisions they make and petition or vote for change 
when change is needed. But no citizen can carry out these 
responsibilities when government is secret . . . . Some 
public officials in state and local governments work hard to 
achieve and enforce open government laws . . . . But such 
official disposition toward openness is exceptional. Hardly 
a day goes by when we don’t hear that a state or local 
 
 32. Cf. RICHARD FEYNMAN, SIX EASY PIECES: ESSENTIALS OF PHYSICS EXPLAINED BY ITS 
MOST BRILLIANT TEACHER (1995) (showing how matters far more complex than positive law 
can be tackled with relative ease). No aspect of the subtitle of Feynman’s seminal text should be 
construed as applying here through my mimicking of his primary title. See also Roger Ebert, Five 
Easy Pieces, CHI. SUN TIMES, (Jan. 1, 1970), available at http://rogerebert.suntimes.com 
/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19700101/REVIEWS/1010309/1023 (discussing the eponymous 
movie’s reference to a book of piano exercises for a child). 
 33. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 86. 
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government is trying to restrict access to records that have 
traditionally been public . . . .34 
State freedom of information acts are the superlaws of public 
scrutiny—allowing citizens insight into, and indirect oversight of, 
government activity.35 They have helped, albeit haltingly, to move 
governments away from cronyism and corruption and toward better 
serving the public they represent. While all state FOIAs differ in 
some way, at their core they all pursue one goal: more openness to 
the very citizens who fund government and to whom government is 
responsible and should be accountable. Of course, FOIAs have not 
come anywhere close to successfully achieving this goal. Moreover, 
their efficacy varies depending on the specific state statute and 
interpretation of it by courts. Although they are not the only weapon 
available in the public’s arsenal, they remain the single best, albeit 
flawed, extant statutory tool for citizen checks on government 
abuse.36 
 
 34. Open Government Guide Introductory Note, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/guides/open-government-guide 
/introduction (last visited Dec. 9, 2011). 
 35. See, e.g., id.; ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 40.25.110 (2011); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (2008); CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§ 6250 (West 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-201 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210 (2012); 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-
70 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-11 (1988); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-338 (2010); 5 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 140 (2012); IND. CODE § 5-14-3-3 (1983); IOWA CODE § 22.2 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45-218 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.872 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:31 
(2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408-A (2011); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-612 
(West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10(a) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.233 
(Lexis 2009); MINN. STAT. § 13.03 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-5 (1972); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 610.011.2 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (2012); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 179A.100 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47:1A (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-4 (1978); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 
1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (2011); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 149.43 (Lexis Nexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.420 
(2011); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-3 (1956); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 30-4-30 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-301 
(1999); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (Vernon 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-201(1) 
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 315 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704 (2011); WASH. REV. 
CODE. § 42.56.080 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-2 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 19.35 (1981); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203 (2011). 
 36. Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of State 
Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption, at 2 n.3 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922859 (“In addition to the anecdotal evidence, there is a growing body 
of literature that addresses the role of the media in promoting government accountability. Some 
recent examples include Djankov et al. (2003), who find that state ownership of the media is 
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FOIA-type statutes date back to the early 1900s, and common 
law equivalents go back even further.37 These efforts were 
exceedingly modest until the 1970s.38 Since then, most states have 
updated their statutes “in an effort to strengthen the laws, often to 
clarify or broaden their scope in response to changing technology, 
judicial decisions or Attorneys General’s opinions.”39 But still, some 
states have done better than others and, as discussed above, 
Pennsylvania is one now-infamous example of a state that has simply 
gotten it wrong.40 
In addition to state FOIAs, perhaps obviously, the federal 
government has its own, quite powerful, FOIA.41 Currently, 
notwithstanding that courts have interpreted the federal FOIA (based 
on its explicit legislative history) broadly to serve the public’s 
interest in open government,42 courts have routinely (and accurately) 
held that the act was not initially designed to apply to state public 
schools. Courts have so held despite the fact that so many of these 
institutions of higher education now receive enormous amounts of 
federal funding43 and the federal government has a significant 
amount of say over how some of these federal funds are allocated.44 
“For example, Massachusetts cut $62 million out of its higher 
 
associated with a number of undesirable characteristics (less press freedom, fewer political rights, 
inferior governance, underdeveloped capital markets, inferior health outcomes, etc.), Besley and 
Prat (2006), who develop a model that predicts that media capture by the government increases 
the likelihood that elected politicians engage in corruption and/or rent extraction and reduces the 
likelihood that bad politicians are identified and replaced, and Snyder and Strömberg (2010), who 
find that more active media coverage of U.S. House representatives leads to better informed 
voters, which increases monitoring, makes the representatives work harder, and results in better 
policies from the constituents' perspective.”). 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Open Government Guide Introductory Note, supra note 34. 
 41. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2011). 
 42. Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 43. See, e.g., St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 
1981) (“[T]he Medicaid program in California . . . is a state-administered program which receives 
federal financial support and which is also highly regulated by the federal government. 
However, . . . the federal government [does not] exercise[] the ‘extensive, detailed and virtually 
day-to-day supervision’ over the program that is needed to characterize the state bodies as federal 
agencies.”); Mamarella v. Cnty. of Westchester, 898 F. Supp. 236, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 44. See Goldie Blumenstyk, College Officials Welcome Obama's Focus on Higher-
Education Costs, but Raise Some Concerns, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Obama-Puts-College-Costs-Front/130503/?sid=wb&utm_source=wb 
&utm_medium=en. 
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education budget this fall . . . [that] was replaced by federal stimulus 
funding . . . . [N]early $40 billion was provided to states [for higher 
education] by the federal government through the State Fiscal 
Stabilization Fund . . . .”45 Moreover, “[i]n 2010 Congress passed the 
Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act, . . . which ended federally 
guaranteed student loans and replaced them with direct loans made 
through the Education Department.”46 And, the “combination of high 
[student-loan] debt and moderate income [upon graduation] makes 
this all-too-typical law graduate eligible for the federal government’s 
income-based repayment program.”47 
B.  FOIA’s Unwitting and 
Unintended Kryptonite: FERPA 
FERPA both ties federal educational funding to a requirement 
that schools maintain policies for student privacy and provides that 
student records may be released to the public if schools remove 
students’ personally identifying information.48 
FERPA is a seemingly innocuous law that serves wholly 
legitimate goals. Unfortunately, however, it has often been used by 
state education institutions to foil valid FOIA requests.49 If FOIAs 
are the superlaws, then FERPA has unintentionally (from the 
legislators’ and public’s perspectives) become their kryptonite. 
When state schools invoke the alleged risk of student 
identification to implicate FERPA in an effort to evade legitimate 
FOIA requests,50 they typically rely on a provision in their state 
FOIA that exempts from disclosure matters that are prohibited from 
release by “other laws.” For example, the Illinois FOIA exempts 
 
 45. Damast, supra note 23. 
 46. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: Federal Loans 
Inflate College Budgets, but How Long Will That Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Their Bills?, 98 
A.B.A. J. 30, 33 (2012). 
 47. Id. at 34. 
 48. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2011); Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 65; Letter 
from LeRoy S. Rooker, Dir., Family Policy Compliance Office, to Matthew J. Pepper, Policy 
Analyst, Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco 
/ferpa/library/nashville_tn2004.html. 
 49. See generally Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 65 (discussing state education institution’s 
attempts to foil valid FOIA requests). 
 50. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 65 (discussing general 
principal that public institutions receiving federal funding will not release information reasonably 
certain to identify a specific student). 
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from mandatory release information specifically prohibited from 
disclosure by federal or state law or rules.51 And, like other 
government entities, the University of Illinois has claimed that this 
provision exempts disclosure for FERPA-related material.52 
State courts have largely rejected this argument, even when 
disclosure of student identity is likely.53 As one state supreme court 
noted, 
The [FERPA] does not forbid such disclosure of 
information concerning a student and, therefore, does not 
forbid opening to the public a faculty meeting at which such 
matters are discussed. The [FERPA] simply cuts off Federal 
funds, otherwise available to an educational institution 
which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of 
such information. Thus, if the [public access] Law applies 
to a meeting of the faculty of the School of Law at which 
such matters are discussed, the right of [public access] . . . 
would continue. Only the availability of Federal funds in 
aid of the institution would be affected. Of course, a 
violation of the [FERPA] could well result, not only in 
termination of any otherwise available Federal financial aid 
to the School of Law but also in the termination of any such 
aid to the entire University.54 
Recently a federal court ruled in accord.55 In Chicago Tribune 
Co. v. University of Illinois Board of Trustees,56 the Tribune 
 
 51. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7-1(a) (2005). 
 52. Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. Of Trs., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2011), 
vacated on other grounds, 680 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 53. See Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Bauer v. Kincaid, 
759 F. Supp. 575, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Red & Black Publ’g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 
257, 260–61 (Ga. 1993); Student Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors v. Byrd, 239 S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. 
1977). But see United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 809 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 54. Student Bar Ass'n, 239 S.E.2d at 419 (emphasis added). 
 55. Chicago Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 676. The Seventh Circuit subsequently vacated the 
district court’s opinion and ordered the case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because the Tribune’s request for documents arose solely under Illinois state law. Chi. Tribune 
Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 680 F.3d 1001, 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012). The appellate court 
declined to “express any opinion on whether the information the Tribune seeks relates to student 
records within the meaning of the 1974 Act and the implementing regulations.” Id. at 1006. 
Numerous district courts have adopted rationales similar to the district court in the Tribune’s 
case. See, e.g., Tombrello, 763 F. Supp. at 545 (“The statute addresses the conditions under which 
an institution becomes ineligible for funds. It does not prohibit a request for or release of student 
records.”); Bauer, 759 F. Supp. at 589 (“FERPA is not a law which prohibits disclosure of 
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requested, under Illinois’s FOIA, information from the University of 
Illinois regarding students who were admitted as a function of 
cronyism.57 In 2009, the Tribune began a series about the University 
of Illinois’s flagship campus that detailed how the relatives of 
various influential individuals received admissions preferences.58 
“The series received a great deal of attention, and the Governor of 
Illinois convened a commission to study the admissions process.”59 
In furtherance of the series and the newspaper’s efforts to discover 
the nature and extent of the cronyism present at the University of 
Illinois, the Tribune made the following FOIA request to the 
university seeking records regarding students who were 
admitted to the University of Illinois and subsequently 
attended the University of Illinois: the names of the 
applicants’ parents and the parents’ addresses, and the 
identity of the individuals who made a request or otherwise 
became involved in such applicants’ applications. . . . [A]ny 
records about the identity of the University official to whom 
the request was made, any other university officials to 
whom the request was forwarded, and any documents 
which reflect any changes in the status of the application as 
a result of that request.60 
 
educational records. It is a provision which imposes a penalty for the disclosure of educational 
records.”); Red & Black Publ’g, 427 S.E.2d at 261 (elucidating that the court had “serious 
questions whether [FERPA] even applies to the exemptions argued by the defendants since 
[FERPA] does not prohibit disclosure of records. Rather, as noted by the trial court, [FERPA] 
provides for the withholding of federal funds for institutions that have a policy or practice of 
permitting the release of educational records,” and reiterating that FERPA allows for the 
dissemination of such information); Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 84. 
 56. 781 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 57. Id. at 673; see also Cordis & Warren, supra note 36, at 2 (“Brett Blackledge, a reporter 
for The Birmingham News, won the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting for a series of 
articles that ‘[exposed] cronyism and corruption in [Alabama's] two-year college system, 
resulting in the dismissal of the chancellor and other corrective action.’ Central to his 
investigation was the collection of reams of financial records, contracts, and disclosure forms. 
Blackledge used this information to piece together a compelling story about state legislators and 
their associates receiving kickbacks and cushy jobs from various members of the school system 
administration. Many of the financial records that he relied upon were uncovered in accordance 
with Alabama's public records law.”). 
 58. Chicago Tribune, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 674. 
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The University of Illinois sought to closet its questionable 
behavior by invoking FERPA.61 The federal district court, however, 
rejected this proffered defense.62 The court reasoned, rather  
simply, that 
FERPA, enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under the 
Spending Clause, does not forbid [state] officials from 
taking any action. Rather, FERPA sets conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds, and it imposes requirements on the 
Secretary of Education to enforce the spending conditions 
by withholding funds in appropriate situations. Under the 
Spending Clause, Congress can set conditions on 
expenditures, even though it might be powerless to compel 
a state to comply under the enumerated powers in Article I. 
[A state] could choose to reject federal education money, 
and the conditions of FERPA along with it, so it cannot be 
said that FERPA prevents [a state] from doing anything.63 
However, even assuming for argument’s sake that FERPA does 
serve to fall into the “other law” exemption in many FOIAs, that 
would still not result in a blanket exemption for state schools. 
Indeed, the United States Department of Education has enacted 
regulations that provide for the redaction of personally identifiable 
information from materials otherwise subject to FERPA.64 Once that 
occurs, the remaining elements of the documents are no longer 
covered by FERPA at all.65 The remaining material would no longer 
be prohibited by “other laws” if, arguendo, the above FERPA 
analysis did not apply. Perhaps unsurprisingly, schools often fail to 
consider that such redactions alter their misstated claims to an 
exemption from the disclosure requirement.66 
Indeed, almost this very issue presents itself in Arkansas, 
because Arkansas’s FOIA expressly references FERPA material.67 
 
 61. Id. at 674. 
 62. Id. at 675. 
 63. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 64. Richard Peltz, From the Ivory Tower to the Glass House: Access to 'De-Identified' 
Public University Admission Records to Study Affirmative Action, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
181, 193 (2009). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 196. 
 67.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b) (2008). 
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That exemption applies until the school affirmatively redacts the 
identity-disclosing material pursuant to the Department of Education 
regulations.68 
Additionally, when a requestor is a school official, the faculty 
member must meet a lower burden of “legitimate educational 
interest.”69 The U.S. Department of Education interprets the term 
“school official” to include “professors; instructors; administrators; 
health staff; counselors; attorneys; clerical staff; trustees; members of 
committees and disciplinary boards; and a contractor, volunteer or 
other party to whom the school has outsourced institutional services 
or functions.”70 A school official generally has a legitimate 
educational interest if he needs to review educational records to 
fulfill his professional responsibility.71 In fact, a “legitimate 
educational interest” need not be academic, per se. “Anything 
relevant to a school official’s job may be a legitimate educational 
interest.”72 Thus, for example, teachers have a legitimate educational 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 65–66; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html (last 
modified Oct. 2, 2012). 
 70. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 
ACT: GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBLE STUDENTS 1, 3 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov 
/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/for-eligible-students.pdf; see also Aufox v. Bd. of Educ., 588 N.E.2d 
316, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the school attorney allowed access as “legitimate 
educational interest”). 
 71. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SHARING INFORMATION: A GUIDE TO THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT 
AND PARTICIPATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 4 (1997), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163705.pdf; THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 
ACT: GUIDANCE FOR ELIGIBLE STUDENTS, supra note 70, at 3; FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE 
OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., MODEL NOTIFICATION OF RIGHTS UNDER FERPA FOR 
POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/ps-officials 
.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2012); FAMILY POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
MODEL NOTIFICATION OF RIGHTS FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/lea-officials.html; see also MASS. CLE INC., 4 
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW MANUAL § 4.4.1(d) (2009) (citing Letter from LeRoy S. 
Rooker, Dir., Family Policy Compliance Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Dr. Peter Likens, 
President, Univ. of Ariz. (Mar. 11, 1999) (“A ‘legitimate educational interest’ can be broadly 
defined to include any circumstances in which the school ‘official’ needs the information in order 
to do his or her job on the school’s behalf.”). 
 72. Daniel Silverman, Student Privacy Versus Human Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. 9, 10 (2008); 
see also Dixie Snow Huefner & Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA Update, Balancing Access to and 
Privacy of Student Records, 152 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 469, 477–78 (2001) (discussing that a 
teacher concerned with class performance or interested in disciplinary actions for safety reasons 
may examine students’ records, but that a teacher interested in which students have high IQs 
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interest in reviewing student disciplinary records.73 To be sure, the 
scope of a legitimate educational interest has limits. For example, a 
school official has no legitimate educational interest in disclosing to 
students that another student has HIV.74 
Some public-school administrators have further asserted that 
they alone decide what constitutes a legitimate educational interest. 
One court hearing this argument reasoned:75 
The Board argues, “[Plaintiff]’s efforts [regarding] the 
permissive educator access provisions of FERPA . . . do[] 
indeed raise the prospect of the undermining of the 
executive authority of the school administration by way of 
judicial override of such authority.” We note that a school 
superintendent has the power to exercise general 
supervision over the schools in his district. However, the 
outcome of this case does not turn on the superintendent’s 
authority. It is instead a matter of statutory interpretation, a 
task clearly within the province of this Court. Our 
elucidation of the statute in question in no way usurps the 
authority of [the superintendent] or the . . . Board of 
Education. Therefore, the Board’s argument is flawed.76 
The public, through the actions of individuals, academic 
researchers, and the press, has exercised its legitimate interest in 
understanding the inner workings of taxpayer-funded education. It 
seeks, inter alia, to expose misdeeds at, and misinformation by, 
 
would not likely have a legitimate educational interest); Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Balancing Law 
Student Privacy Interests and Progressive Pedagogy: Dispelling the Myth that FERPA Prohibits 
Cutting-Edge Academic Support Methodologies, 19 WIDENER L.J. 215, 256–61 (2009) 
(discussing legitimate educational interest in the release of educational records to law school 
academic support personnel); Nancy Tribbensee, Privacy and Confidentiality: Balancing Student 
Rights and Campus Safety, 34 J.C. & U.L. 393, 400 (2008) (“A legitimate educational interest is 
not strictly limited to academic or educational matters, and permitted disclosures are not limited 
to those that may address the student's interest or that may be to the benefit of the student.”). 
 73. See Achman v. Chi. Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, 45 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (D. 
Minn. 1999); Linson v. Trus. of Univ. of Pa., No. CIV. A. 95-3681, 1996 WL 637810, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 4, 1996); E. Conn. State Univ. v. Freedom of Info. Comm., No. CV 960556097, 1996 
WL 580966, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1996). 
 74. Jennifer C. Wasson, FERPA in the Age of Computer Logging: School Discretion at the 
Cost of Student Privacy?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1348, 1369 (2003) (citation omitted); accord Medley 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty., 168 S.W.3d 398 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 75. Medley, 168 S.W.3d at 398 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 76. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted). 
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public institutions; to examine the stewardship of the public fisc; to 
obtain data for analyses of admissions systems; and to determine 
whether schools are presenting accurate data regarding, inter alia, 
students’ probability of graduating and graduates’ likelihood of 
obtaining gainful postgraduation employment—a highly contentious 
issue at law schools right now.77 The tool for such endeavors has 
very often been state FOIAs. 
III.  ADMISSIONS DATA 
The experiences of various academics seeking information about 
admissions programs at public universities mirror that of the Tribune 
discussed above. In some of these cases, school officials rely on 
criteria for admissions that may be, inter alia, improper, illegal, 
impolitic, embarrassing to the school officials administering these 
admissions programs, or simply not made public. 
Law professor Richard Peltz-Steele—who is a noted expert on 
state FOIAs78—and I separately sought de-identified public-
university data to examine law school admissions standards.  
De-identified admissions data is used, among other things, in 
research regarding the correlation between students’ incoming 
credentials and subsequent bar passage rates.79 Studies confirm that 
 
 77. See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F.Supp.2d 672, 673 (N.D. Ill. 
2011), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2012); ROBERT ZELNICK, BACKFIRE: A 
REPORTER’S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 177 (1996); Peltz, supra note 64; Richard H. 
Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
367, 412 (2004); Steinbuch, supra note 14; Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011); Antonio Olivo, Appeals Court Hears U. of I. Dispute with Tribune, 
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-30/news/ct-met-u-of-i-
1001-2011 1001_1_appeals-court-federal-court-federal-issue; Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz, 
Reporting or Emoting? 4, Project SEAPHE (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/100204 
-nyt-response.pdf. 
 78. See RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2012); JOHN J. WATKINS & RICHARD J. PELTZ, ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT (5th ed., 2009). 
 79. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 68; see also RANKO SHIRAKI OLIVER, REPORT TO THE 
2007–2008 ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE OF THE UALR (Mar. 27, 2009), available at 
http://ualr.edu/law/files/2011/04/additional0809.pdf [hereinafter OLIVER REPORT] (reporting on 
current student-assessment techniques and suggested changes); Best Value Law Schools, NAT’L 
JURIST (Oct. 16, 2009, 10:25 AM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/best-value-law-schools 
(discussing how the National Law Journal accounts for bar passage rates in assessing the value of 
a law school); AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010–2011 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 
17 (2010–2011 ed.) (discussing that the ABA evaluates the bar passage rate as part of its law 
school accreditation process). 
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low incoming scores directly correlate with poor bar performance—a 
factor relevant to the expenditure of limited taxpayer dollars.80 
Professor Peltz-Steele and I were each denied the requested data.81 
Analysis of such data can be used to discuss whether admissions 
programs sometimes harm those students they are designed to help as 
well as the institutions adopting them.82 “A low U.S. News ranking 
 
A study released in 1998 by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) concluded 
that “[b]oth law school gradepoint average (LGPA) and Law School Admission Test 
(LSAT) score were the strongest predictors of bar examination passage for all groups 
studied.” A study conducted by the NCBE of applicants to the New York bar 
determined that “performance on the bar exam was strongly correlated with 
performance in law school, as measured by law school grade point average 
(LGPA) . . . .” A study conducted using data from all 2001–2005 graduates of the Saint 
Louis University School of Law who took the Missouri bar examination as their first 
bar examination “confirmed an association between bar examination passage and final 
law school class rank,” with 100 percent of those in the top quartile passing the bar 
examination on their first attempt and only 49.5 percent of those in the fourth quartile 
passing on their first attempt. Two studies conducted at the Bowen School of Law have 
confirmed a link between academic performance and bar passage. In a study conducted 
by Arkansas Bar Foundation Professor of Law Lynn Foster examining bar exam 
applications who took the Arkansas Bar Exam [in] July 1998 to February 2000, the 
“highest correlation” was “between number of hours below a C and failing the bar 
exam.” Another study, conducted by the 2004–2005 Long Range Planning Committee 
when chaired by Professor Richard J. Peltz, determined that first year GPA, GPA in 
bar courses, and number of hours below a C “each explains, or predicts, between 
twenty and twenty-five percent of bar performance. 
OLIVER REPORT, at 24 n. 24 (citations omitted); see Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 68. 
 80. See Sander & Yakowitz, supra note 77; Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 68. 
 81. See Peltz, supra note 64; Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 67; Yakowitz, supra note 77. 
 82. See Affirmative Action in American Law School, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS (2007), 
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/AALSreport.pdf (evaluating the effect that race-based 
admittance has on the academic performance of African-American law students). According to 
Richard Sander, a law professor at the University of California–Los Angeles, because low LSAT 
scores are high indicators of subsequent law school failure, affirmative action has an unintended, 
negative effect on students who are admitted based on racial preference. Id. Sander posits that 
academic mismatch, which often occurs when students with below average LSAT scores are 
admitted into law schools, plays a significant role in explaining the racial disparities in bar 
passage rates and academic performance. Id. In contrast, Richard O. Lempart, a professor at the 
University of Michigan Law School, asserts that LSAT scores are not indicative of a law 
student’s future success, income, or job satisfaction, regardless of race. Id.; Steinbuch, supra note 
14, at 68. Another professor, who wished to remain anonymous, discussed the application of 
diversity in hiring in higher education: 
So while the presidents, provosts, and deans pad their C.V.s with the successful 
“diversity initiatives” they have launched on their campuses to propel themselves to the 
next rung on the administrative ladder, we, the supposed benefactors of the “diversity 
initiative,” are left trying to survive in an environment where our colleagues see us as 
less worthy and less able. Has anybody stopped to consider what the constant and 
overwhelming emphasis on our “diversity” does to and for us? We constantly have to 
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may result in a vicious cycle of attracting less-well-credentialed 
students and diminishing employment opportunities for all upon 
graduation. Thus, an entire student body can pay for the decision to 
admit students who won’t succeed.” 83 And schools do students who 
ultimately fail no favors by admitting them beyond saddling them 
with debt and regret. 
Recently, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock released a 
public report it commissioned regarding factors that correlate to bar 
passage.84 The data in the report described that first-time bar passage 
is linked to Law School Admission Test (LSAT) scores and 
undergraduate and law school grades.85 This is consistent with other 
studies. “While the LSAT is primarily designed to measure success 
in law school, it has long been known that law school success 
predicts bar exam success. As such, most law schools have bar exam 
pass rates that correlate to their incoming LSAT scores.”86 Since 
LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point averages (GPA) predict 
law school GPAs, these three factors obviously overlap. Indeed, their 
relationship to bar passage demonstrates the uncontroversial, broader 
 
"come out" about our academic achievements, constantly have to prove to our 
colleagues that we do in fact deserve to be here. 
It is not that I am opposed to colleges diversifying. Quite the contrary! Faculty of 
color wouldn’t be seen as rare and exotic species if college campuses were more 
diversified and more integrated. It would also help minimize the circus sideshow 
during faculty orientation. What I am opposed to, however, is all the talk and emphasis 
that administrators put on our diversity to the detriment and outright neglect of 
everything else we bring to the table. 
Anonymous, Not Just a Diversity Number, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (June 13, 2012, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2012/06/13/essay-how-colleges-treat-diversity-hires 
#ixzz1y0wUDRQS. 
 83. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 71–72. 
 84. HANOVER REPORT, BAR PASSAGE CORRELATION STUDY (Feb. 2012). Given previous 
disagreements over the public nature of requested documents, I formally requested the report 
under Arkansas’s Freedom of Information Act in order to confirm that the governmental unit 
holding the document (the university) itself also believes the report to be a public document. The 
Dean and University Counsel confirmed its public status. E-mail from Mandy Hull Abernathy, 
Univ. Counsel, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, to John M.A. DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen 
Sch. of Law (Feb. 21, 2012, 16:45 CST), forwarded by John M.A. DiPippa, Dean, William H. 
Bowen Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 22, 2012, 08:39 CST). (“[T]he report prepared by Hanover is 
a public document that is not exempt from disclosure under FOIA . . . [i]t is my understanding 
that you have already provided a copy of the report to Professor Steinbuch.”). 
 85. HANOVER REPORT, supra note 84, at 9. 
 86. Rebecca Larsen, Best Schools for Bar Exam Preparation, NATIONAL JURIST Feb. 2012, 
at 28, 29, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/cypress/nationaljurist0212/index.php 
#/28. 
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point that better students have a greater likelihood of passing the bar. 
Thus, LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs are valid preadmission 
predictors of first-time bar passage. 
But the data presented in the Arkansas report also revealed 
conclusions that are useful for many law schools following similar 
common admissions patterns. The report shows that during the 
period of February 2005 to July 2011, graduating white students 
passed the bar on their first attempt 79.6% of the time, and this 
cohort—by far the largest—had 624 members.87 African American 
students passed 59% of the time.88 There were fifty-six members of 
this cohort.89 Hispanic students passed 81.8% of the time, multiracial 
students passed 71.4% of the time, Native Americans students passed 
45.5% of the time, “other” students passed 100.0% of the time, and 
students whose race was “unknown” passed 60.0% of the time.90 
Each of these latter cohorts had eleven or fewer members.91 Also, 
regarding the academic success of different cohorts at the school, a 
FOIA-released memo described the asserted data “that of the nine 
first year law students who weren’t successful, four were African 
American, and one was Hispanic.”92 Moreover, “[t]he most striking 
difference between J.D.-holders and those who never pass the bar is 
the disproportionate number of minority never-passers. . . . black and 
Hispanic law school graduates are at least twice as likely as white 
graduates to become a never-passer.”93 
Since we can conclude that cohort membership in a particular 
group is not a causal factor for bar passage, we should analyze 
whether the higher failure rate for some cohorts is driven by, inter 
alia, admissions standards and academic-success programs.94 Several 
 
 87. HANOVER REPORT, supra note 84, at 8, 4 (Feb. 2012). 
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. Id. at 4–5, 8. 
 92. Meeting Notes from Andy Taylor, Assistant Dean for Academic Support, Univ. of Ark. 
at Little Rock, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law (Oct. 16, 2006) (on file with author) (summarizing 
meeting between Dean Taylor and Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Assistant Professor of Law and Director, 
Institute on Race and Ethnicity). 
 93. Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who 
Fail the Bar Exam, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 19 (2010). 
 94. See HANOVER REPORT, supra note 84; Sander, supra note 77, at 411–18; Jane Yakowitz, 
supra note 93, at 20 (“I include this demographic data for purely descriptive purposes, not to 
suggest that race has a causal relationship with failing the bar examination. In fact, the bar 
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scholars have explored this issue,95 and a letter from a previous 
school dean implicitly discusses the basis provided by the other 
scholars for what is known as an “admissions mismatch”: 
[While] African Americans receive approximately nine 
percent of the bachelors degrees conferred in our country, 
[and] . . . African Americans make up approximately ten 
percent of the applicant pool to ABA-accredited law 
schools[,] [o]ur entering class of 2005 was [composed] of 
13% African Americans . . . [and] this year’s entering class 
is 12% African American. . . . T[hus,] [t]his School has a 
greater percentage of African Americans in its entering 
class for 2005 and 2006 than [both] the percentage of 
African Americans earning bachelors degrees and the 
percentage of African Americans in the national law school 
pool.96 
Since a cohort is accepted at percentages above its presence in 
the relevant general population, these scholars suggest that some 
within these cohorts, therefore, have academic profiles below 
students in cohorts that more closely mirror relevant population 
percentages.97 Indeed, this effect is likely amplified as one travels 
downward in school rankings if the process occurs systematically at 
all institutions due to the cumulative effect of the deficit caused by 
mismatching. 
 
passage study data confirms what bar exam validation studies had found before: that race does not 
play a statistically significant role in bar passage when LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA, and 
law school GPA are controlled. Table 6-3 provides complete regression results. In other words, 
minority J.D.s are not more likely to become never-passers because they're minorities; rather, 
they are more likely to become never-passers because their LSAT, undergraduate GPA, and law 
school grades are lower on average than those of white law school graduates.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 77, at 412–18. 
 96. Letter from Charles W. Goldner, Jr., Dean and Professor of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, to Eric Spencer Buchanan, Esq., President, W. Harold 
Flowers Law Soc’y (Feb. 2, 2007) (emphasis added) (on file with author). Similar results are 
reflected in the overall percentages of college graduates. “Among Hispanics, the share of adults 
holding bachelor’s degrees grew [this year] from 11.1 percent in 2001 to 14.1 percent last year, 
and among blacks it climbed from 15.7 percent to 19.9 percent. But the distinction rose even 
faster among non-Hispanic whites, from 28.7 percent to 34 percent.” Richard Pérez-Peña, U.S. 
Bachelor Degree Rate Passes Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/02/24/education/census-finds-bachelors-degrees-at-record-level.html. 
 97. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Listening to the Debate on Reforming Law School 
Admissions Preferences, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 889, 937 (2011). 
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Moreover, the mismatch theory suggests that this problem is 
magnified for those groups with excessive downward deviation from 
the mean acceptance profile, since the members of these cohorts 
cluster at the bottom of the class, get lower grades, and learn less 
because the instruction is not targeted toward them.98 In contrast, 
members of non-below-mean cohorts with similar score profiles tend 
to “go to much less elite schools, get better grades, learn more and, 
thus, do far better on the bar.”99 I suspect the robustness of this 
effect, though, is diminished at a third-tier school, as when compared 
to a first tier school. 
In order to further investigate these issues, I sought the 
underlying data given to the statistics firm (Hanover), so that I could 
perform additional analyses. The university refused my request to 
access these documents, claiming that “[t]he issue is that the cohort 
of students is so small in some years that the individuals can be 
identified.”100 In an effort to address this concern, I revised my 
request to aggregate small cohorts. 101 I received a response asserting 
that the requested data is exempt from disclosure regardless as to 
whether redaction would sufficiently remove the identity of any 
student referenced in the documents at issue.102 
This interpretation is inconsistent with Arkansas’s FOIA. 
Arkansas has a robust FOIA. In fact, one paper empirically classified 
Arkansas’s FOIA as “strong” based on a score above six points—out 
of a maximum of eleven points—on the authors’ metric for 
measuring the vigor of state FOIAs.103 During 1986 to 1987 
Arkansas’s FOIA scored seven points.104 From 1988 to 2001, 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock, William H. Bowen Sch. 
of Law, to author (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author). 
 101. E-mail from author to John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of 
Ark. at Little Rock, Univ. Counsel, Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock (Feb. 20, 2012) (on file with 
author). 
 102. E-mail from Mandy Abernathy, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock, to 
author (Feb. 22, 2012 8:39 AM) (on file with author). 
 103. See Cordis & Warren, supra note 36, at 11 (Apr. 2, 2012). 
 104. Id. at 34. 
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Arkansas’s FOIA scored eight points.105 From 2002 to 2009 (the last 
year of the study), Arkansas’s FOIA scored ten points.106 
Arkansas . . . enacted its FOIA law in 1967. Prior to this 
time the Arkansas code did little to provide for the 
inspection of public records. The FOIA law was passed as a 
result of a number of factors, including support from 
journalists, the results of a study by the Arkansas 
Legislative Council that looked at the laws of other states, 
and litigation by the state Republican Party that culminated 
in a state Supreme Court decision indicating a willingness 
on the part of the court to recognize an extensive right to 
access public records. The law has been amended several 
times since its enactment. The amendments address judicial 
decisions or issues not anticipated by the law when it was 
initially passed. For instance, it was amended in 2001 to 
address access to records stored in electronic form.107 
In response to the explanation for the denial of the request, I 
described that the exemption related to FERPA only applies until the 
identity-disclosing material is redacted pursuant to the Department of 
Education regulations.108 This conclusion is based on three 
considerations: (1) the redaction requirement of most FOIAs, 
including Arkansas’s; (2) the Arkansas and general legislative and 
judicial doctrines favoring disclosure and requiring construing FOIA 
exemptions narrowly; (3) the statutory language of those exemptions 
and the federal FERPA regulations. 
First, the Arkansas FOIA requires maximum production through 
redaction. Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-19-105(f)(1)–(3) 
provide: 
(f)(1) No request to inspect, copy, or obtain copies of public 
records shall be denied on the ground that information 
exempt from disclosure is commingled with nonexempt 
information. 
(2) Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be 
provided after deletion of the exempt information. 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 9. 
 108. Peltz, supra note 64, at 192–96 (2009). 
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(3) The amount of information deleted shall be indicated on 
the released portion of the record and, if technically 
feasible, at the place in the record where the deletion was 
made.109 
Second, the Arkansas Supreme Court outlined that it “liberally 
interpret[s] the FOIA to accomplish its broad and laudable purpose 
that public business be performed in an open and public manner . . . 
and broadly construes the Act in favor of disclosure.”110 
Third, the Arkansas FOIA only “exempts” FERPA-defined 
education records from disclosure “unless their disclosure is 
consistent with the provisions of [FERPA].”111 Thus, it is not a 
“FERPA exemption,” per se. It merely dictates how FERPA-related 
material is to be handled before disclosure. And FERPA regulations, 
along with the aforementioned FOIA-redaction provisions,  
§ 25-19-105(f)(1)–(3), provide the means to have disclosure 
consistent with the FERPA statute, as required by the statute.112 
The federal regulation reads as follows: 
(b)(1) De-identified records and information. An 
educational agency or institution, or a party that has 
received education records or information from education 
records under this part, may release the records or 
information without the consent required by § 99.30 after 
the removal of all personally identifiable information 
provided that the educational agency or institution or other 
party has made a reasonable determination that a student’s 
identity is not personally identifiable, whether through 
single or multiple releases, and taking into account other 
reasonably available information.113 
Thus, while redaction under FERPA is discretionary, it is not 
under the Arkansas FOIA.114 If a public agency can find a way to 
produce the requested documents that is “consistent with the 
provisions of” FERPA, it must.115 Indeed, caselaw provides 
 
 109. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-105(f)(1)–(3) (2002). 
 110. Thomas v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 66, 2012 WL 503879, at *4 (2012). 
 111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2). 
 112. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b)(1) (2012). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2) (2011). 
 115. Id. 
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examples in which courts have held that the production of 
educational records under the FOIA is consistent with FERPA.116 
Further, the only treatise on the Arkansas FOIA—which is 
extensively cited by the Arkansas Supreme Court—states that 
[b]ecause FERPA does not bar disclosure of [identity-
redacted educational records], it is not exempt under 
subsection (b)(2) and therefore must be disclosed pursuant 
to a FOIA request. . . . This approach is consistent with the 
Arkansas FOIA’s requirement that records containing both 
exempt and non-exempt information be disclosed with the 
latter deleted.117 
The same treatise presents the Wisconsin case of Osborne v. Board 
of Regents.118 There, Osborne made a FOIA request to the University 
of Wisconsin.119 He directed part of the request toward the law 
school.120 He sought the following information about every person 
who applied to the law school from 1993 through 1997 (whether the 
applicant ultimately enrolled or not): (1) sex, (2) race, (3) first-year 
law school GPA, (4) undergraduate major, (5) LSAT score, 
(6) undergraduate class rank, and (7) undergraduate GPA.121 The 
university denied several of the requests, “including those for test 
scores, grade point averages, and class rank by race or sex,” asserting 
 
 116. E.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Nothing in the 
FERPA would prevent the Universities from releasing properly redacted records.”); Naglak v. Pa. 
State Univ., 133 F.R.D. 18, 24 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (“Defendants contend that the information sought 
by plaintiff is protected from disclosure by the Educational Privacy Act. We agree that disclosure 
of names and addresses would violate the Act. However, that problem can be remedied by 
submitting the information requested in statistical, summary form, listing, e.g. the number of 
transferees, the exams which they took for transfer purposes, the schools which sponsored them, 
etc., but omitting the students' names and addresses. This will give plaintiff the data she seeks, but 
avoid any breach of confidentiality.”); see also Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 
65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 561–62 (Ill. 1989) (holding under state statute akin to FERPA that a school 
district was obliged to de-identify student records and produce them pursuant to FOIA request); 
Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 2001-046 n.1 (2001) (“[I]t should be noted that [FERPA] does contain 
certain exemptions . . . . A determination of whether this exemption from FERPA applies to the 
situation about which you have inquired would require that various questions of fact be 
answered.”). 
 117. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 78, at § 3.04(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
 118. 647 N.W.2d 158, 175 (Wis. 2002); see WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 78, at 
§ 3.04(b)(4). 
 119. Osborne, 647 N.W.2d at 160. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 163 n.6. 
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that these items were shielded from disclosure under FERPA.122 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously rejected the university’s 
claim and ordered it to produce the requested materials.123 
The high court ruled that the language of FERPA is simply not 
consistent with the claim that it prohibits the production of “all 
information in education records.”124 Indeed, the court stated that 
such a reading would render part of the statutory language 
“meaningless,” violating the axiom that every word in a statute 
should be given operative effect.125 
The court then held that the requested materials did not 
constitute personally identifiable information.126 First, the court 
explained that information is “personally identifiable” only if it 
“would make a student’s identity traceable.”127 “[T]he plain language 
of the Act itself” required this conclusion.128 Next, the court found 
that the data Osborne sought could not be linked to specific students: 
“The list of somewhat minimal information Osborne requests—grade 
point average, test scores, race, gender, and ethnicity (if recorded)—
is not sufficient, by itself, to trace the identity of an applicant.”129 
Accordingly, FERPA permits production of the information sought 
by Osborne (after redaction of anything else in the relevant education 
records).130 
The parallels between Osborne and the instant matter are 
striking. My requests for LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA, law 
school GPAs, race, and gender are exactly the same as the items 
approved of in Osborne. And the age data I requested is clearly 
analogous. 
Two Arkansas Attorney General opinions also lead to the 
conclusion that FERPA material is subject to the redaction 
requirement articulated by the Arkansas FOIA and caselaw. The first 
Attorney General opinion stated: 
 
 122. Id. at 163–64. 
 123. Id. at 177. 
 124. Id. at 163–64. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 169–71. 
 127. Id. at 169. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 171. 
 130. Id. 
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[T]he student’s name (and, to the extent it might identify 
the student, his mother’s name) should be redacted pursuant 
to the following provision of A.C.A. § 25-19-105: 
(b) It is the specific intent of this section that the 
following shall not be deemed to be made open to the 
public under the provisions of this chapter: 
* * * 
(2) . . . education records as defined in the Federal 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g, unless their disclosure is consistent with the 
provisions of that act [.]131 
Thus, the Arkansas Attorney General concluded that the 
Arkansas FOIA requires the disclosure of educational records, as 
defined by FERPA, once the personally identifying information is 
redacted. 
The second Arkansas Attorney General Opinion, in which the 
Attorney General discussed compilations of information, addressed a 
situation quite similar to the one I faced. The Attorney General 
opined: 
I am assuming that a compilation would not disclose the 
names of the various students’ parents or guardians, instead 
merely summarizing the range of education among home 
school teachers. In the unlikely event a compilation would 
set forth such names, I believe the records would be subject 
to disclosure only with the names redacted, since any 
document setting forth the names of the parents or 
guardians who intend to educate a student qualifies as that 
student’s “education records” and “personally identifiable 
information” exempt from unauthorized disclosure under 
FERPA.132 
Again, the Arkansas Attorney General concluded that the 
Arkansas FOIA requires the disclosure of educational records, as 
defined by FERPA, once the personally identifying information is 
redacted. Indeed, the Arkansas legislature so strongly favors 
 
 131. Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. 2007-061 (2007) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
 132. Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. 2004-018, 5 n.2 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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disclosure that in order to ensure compliance by public officials with 
the FOIA, it holds public officials criminally responsible.133 
A colleague of mine, law professor Joshua Silverstein, also 
made information requests at the same time I did. He is an expert in 
grading methods, and he studies, inter alia, curves, means, medians, 
and grade distributions. For both scholarly and academic-service 
purposes, he requested (1) the undergraduate and law school 
transcript of every student who started law school in the fall of 2006 
and who completed at least the first semester with everything except 
the actual letter grades redacted, and (2) the law school class roster 
grading forms for fall 2011 that contain only the aggregate incoming 
class GPA of the students in each course. 
The university initially denied both of Professor Silverstein’s 
requests because it maintained “that documents covered by FERPA 
are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA” and that [r]edaction is 
only an issue when the document in question is covered by FOIA.”134 
Thereafter, however, the university told Professor Silverstein that he 
would receive the material enumerated as (2) above.135 
In pursuing our FOIA requests, Professor Silverstein and I were 
presented with several roadblocks. First, we were told that we would 
need to get the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB).136 
“The role of the IRB is to review research protocols involving human 
subjects and to assure that the research project is carried out with due 
regard for the human participants in accordance with all federal, 
state, and local guidelines.”137 In order to pursue this instruction, I 
requested the IRB-related material that the school created relating to 
Hanover’s extant work for the law school so that I could model my 
 
 133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-104 (2008). 
 134. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, to Joshua Silverstein, Professor, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock (Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with author). 
 135. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, to Joshua Silverstein, Professor, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law (Mar. 12, 2012) (on file 
with author). 
 136. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, to author (Feb. 20, 2012, 2:23 PM) (on file with author). 
 137. Institutional Review Board, UNIV. OF ARK. AT LITTLE ROCK, http://ualr.edu/irb/ (last 
visited May 23, 2012). 
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request thereon.138 The response that I received stated that the school 
did not seek IRB approval for the Hanover study.139 Nonetheless, I 
contacted the IRB. The IRB informed me that my research does not 
require IRB approval.140 
Thereafter, Professor Silverstein, in contacting the 
administration about these FOIA issues, was told that he was not 
being paid with summer research funding to work on the piece for 
which he was seeking public documents.141 The administration 
advised Professor Silverstein that his time and effort would be better 
spent working on matters other than grading practices.142 
While this discussion of access is very important, as it is the 
means to address the underlying substantive questions, the broader 
issue of the welfare of admitted students is paramount. Admissions 
programs are best when they serve productive ends and do not take 
unfair advantage of people by disproportionately setting them up for 
failure. The negative consequences of poorly designed programs are 
that (1) students admitted under flawed programs who ultimately fail 
suffer significantly both financially and emotionally;143 and 
(2) taxpayer money will be spent on the subsidization of a higher rate 
of unsuccessful educational attempts.144 Researchers seek to measure 
these costs through access to student data and then to compare them 
 
 138. E-mail from author to John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of 
Ark. at Little Rock (Feb. 20, 2012, 3:59 PM) (on file with author). 
 139. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, to author (Feb. 20, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with author). 
 140. Memorandum from Dr. Elisabeth Sherwin, IRB Chair, Inst. Review Bd., to author 
(Mar. 7, 2012) (on file with author). 
 141. E-mail from John DiPippa, Dean, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of Ark. at Little 
Rock, to Professor Joshua Silverstein, Assoc. Professor, William H. Bowen Sch. of Law, Univ. of 
Ark. at Little Rock (May 14, 2012, 15:19 CST) (on file with author). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 99. 
 144. See Cheryl L. Auster, Comment, Promising a Better Future but Delivering Debt: 
Understanding the Financial and Social Impact of For-Profit Colleges and the Effect of the New 
Program Integrity Rules, 13 THE SCHOLAR 631, 667–68 (2011) (discussing for-profit colleges 
and their frequent use of federal funding). 
High levels of student debt have been shown to impact the student and the public in 
three main ways. These are: (1) the financial burden on the individual; (2) the expense 
of loan subsidies to taxpayers; and (3) the negative effect of defaults on the individual 
and the taxpayer. Simply put, an individual facing the burden of a large debt does not 
have disposable income, and therefore, the individual is less likely to make purchases 
or save. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 99. 
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to the benefit of advancing those whose admission scores do not 
truly reflect their abilities as a consequence of outside forces beyond 
their control.145 This is a relatively new phenomenon: 
The debate over affirmative action in higher education 
has entered a new era. For decades the argument was 
largely ideological, between those who thought racial 
preferences were intrinsically a betrayal of the color-blind 
ideals of the civil rights movement, and those who believed 
that a sudden shift from Jim Crow to official color-
blindness would leave the upper reaches of America 
segregated and impervious to change. In sharp contrast, the 
emerging debate is empirical and pragmatic. Few 
proponents of affirmative action believe it should go on 
indefinitely; most proponents acknowledge that preferences 
carry with them some undesirable side-effects. Few of those 
who oppose racial preferences are really comfortable with 
the idea of minority numbers dwindling towards zero at any 
elite institution. These are circumstances in which it is 
possible for angry debate to evolve into discussion, where 
empirical findings matter and where policy alternatives can 
be candidly compared. Under such hopeful conditions, the 
premium on combat skills declines and the value of 
listening goes up.146 
Moreover, when the costs of admissions programs that result in 
increased failures are borne by students and taxpayers instead of 
institutional, governmental decision makers, the market is unable to 
aid in correcting any imbalance.147 Since market forces will unlikely 
be the sole mechanism for such decisions, we should strive to 
facilitate disclosures that will improve such systems. 
 
 145. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 77–78 (discussing the costs of overlooking scores in 
admission decisions, which include greater investment in academic support programs and loss of 
academic reputation). See generally Sander, supra note 97, at 889 (discussing the costs associated 
with mismatching student admissions). 
 146. Sander, supra note 145, at 889. 
 147. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 99. (“We do no service for the taxpayers of a relatively poor 
state, with an unsatisfactory distribution of lawyers, by admitting students with an insufficient 
chance of becoming lawyers . . . . The needless expense and missed opportunities for both failing 
students and taxpayers are significant.”). 
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IV.  FERPA REVISION 
Since FERPA is often improperly invoked in response to valid 
FOIA requests by members of the public, as well as requests by 
school officials for legitimate educational interests, legislation 
endorsing and adopting the judicial opinions that hold that FERPA 
should not be interposed as a bar to complying with state or federal 
FOIA requests would aid in correcting this problem. 
As discussed above, the “long history of well-documented 
excesses has led to calls for FERPA reform. . . . U.S. Sen. Sherrod 
Brown, D-Ohio, wrote to the Department of Education urging the 
agency to issue rules clarifying and narrowing the [proper] scope of 
FERPA secrecy.”148 Senator Brown stated, “‘It is important that the 
public have confidence in the integrity of our higher education 
system . . . .’”149 Unfortunately, “[a]s of September 2011, neither the 
Department nor Congress has moved to narrow or clarify FERPA, 
and the abuses continue.”150 
As such, I propose that Congress revise FERPA to prevent 
(1) educational institutions that receive federal funding from 
improperly restricting access to relevant data by appropriate 
government officials and educators; and (2) the above-mentioned 
improper invocation of FERPA in response to FOIA requests. My 
proposal follows: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “FERPA Revision Act of 
2013.” 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds that— 
(1) Appropriate government officials and educators have 
legitimate oversight and educational interest in knowing 
how federally supported institutions of higher education 
operate. Nonetheless, institutions receiving federal funding 
have refused, and continue to refuse, to respond to 
 
 148. STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, A Student Press Law Center White Paper: FERPA and 
Access to Public Records 7 (2011), http://www.splc.org/pdf/ferpa_wp.pdf (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. (quoting U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, calling for FERPA reform). 
 150. Id. 
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legitimate requests from government officials and educators 
by improperly invoking FERPA. 
(2) Various court opinions have established that FERPA, 
enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under the Spending 
Clause, does not forbid government officials from taking 
any action. Rather, FERPA sets conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds, and it imposes requirements on the Secretary 
of Education to enforce the spending conditions by 
withholding funds in appropriate situations. As such, 
FERPA may not be interposed as preventing or prohibiting 
disclosure under any freedom of information act or similar 
request. Chicago Tribune v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., No. 10 
C 0568, 2011 WL 982531, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011); 
Tombrello v. USX Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D. Ala. 
1991); Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 589 (W.D. Mo. 
1991); Red & Black Publ’g Co., v. Bd. of Regents, 427 
S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993); Student Bar Ass’n v. Byrd, 239 
S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. 1977). Nonetheless, institutions 
receiving federal funding have improperly refused, and 
continue to improperly refuse, to comply with freedom of 
information act requests on the assertion that disclosure is 
prohibited by FERPA. 
 
SECTION 3. PROMOTING THE INTEGRITY OF FEDERAL 
FUNDING OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BY ASSURING 
OVERSIGHT. 
(1) Amendments to FERPA. 
(a) 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) is amended by striking its 
language and replacing it with: 
“(A) any other school official, including any teacher—
other than adjunct or substitute faculty—within the 
agency or institution, unless the agency or institution can 
establish through an agency-initiated federal action by 
clear and convincing evidence that the other school 
official has no legitimate educational interest in the 
material. Any other school official has a presumptively 
legitimate educational interest in any material relating to 
admissions, scholarships, fundraising, financial aid, and 
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allocation of resources, regardless of whether the material 
sought addresses individual or collective decisions, 
practices, and/or policies. In addition, any other school 
official has legitimate educational interests in many other 
types of material, and the above should in no way be 
interpreted to suggest that any other school official’s 
legitimate educational interest is somehow limited by the 
above presumption.” 
(b) 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(C) is amended by striking its 
language and replacing it with: 
“(C) (i) authorized representatives of— 
(I) the Comptroller General of the United States; 
(II) the Attorney General of the United States; 
(III) the Secretary of Education; 
(IV) State educational authorities, under the 
conditions set forth in paragraph (3), 
(V) State equivalents of (I)–(III) above, under the 
conditions set forth in paragraph (3); 
(ii) authorized representatives of the Attorney General for 
law enforcement purposes under the same conditions as 
apply to the Secretary under paragraph (3); or 
 (iii) Any duly elected federal or State representative who 
has oversight of and/or budgetary authority over, or 
provides partial or total funding for, any part of the 
agency or institution, under the conditions set forth in 
paragraph (3).” 
(c) 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) is amended by adding a 
section (M) as follows: 
“(M) Codification of caselaw. No educational agency or 
institution, or party that has received education records or 
information, may in response to a request made under any 
federal or State public access and/or freedom of 
information or similar law(s) properly assert that the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), or 
Regulations promulgated thereto, prevent, prohibit, or 
limit the release of any records. FERPA, enacted pursuant 
to Congress’ power under the Spending Clause, does not 
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forbid government officials from taking any action. 
Rather, FERPA sets conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds, and it imposes requirements on the Secretary of 
Education to enforce the spending conditions by 
withholding funds in appropriate situations. As such, 
FERPA does not prevent or prohibit disclosure under any 
freedom of information act or similar request. An 
educational agency or institution, or a party that has 
received education records or information, seeking to de-
identify individual student records for the purposes of 
satisfying conditions on the receipt of federal funds shall 
do so pursuant to the federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant to FERPA. Any reasonable attempt to satisfy 
those regulations shall satisfy FERPA for the purposes of 
meeting the conditions on the receipt of federal funds. 
Any attempt to excessively de-identify records shall 
constitute a violation of FERPA, violating conditions on 
the receipt of federal funds.” 
V.  OPENNESS IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 
Institutions of higher education that receive public funds have 
insufficient incentives to fully disclose accurate admissions data to 
the public and prospective students, which would enable both to 
make informed decisions about how to invest their limited resources. 
Rather, many institutions, while spending taxpayer funds, replace the 
judgments of the public they serve regarding broad allocation of 
resources with their own private views. Legislation mandating that 
higher-education schools that receive public funds affirmatively 
disclose critical data about their admissions programs would assist in 
addressing this problem. 
Affirmative admissions programs alter the basic process for 
acceptance to higher-education institutions. The costs and benefits of 
these programs are difficult to measure and implicate serious, 
complex policy issues that should be open for public discussion and 
input—even though admissions standards are not (nor should not) be 
controlled by plebiscite. Unfortunately, schools are often hesitant to 
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disclose the nature of their admissions programs, even when they 
receive taxpayer funds. 
Moreover, the admission of underqualified students not only 
serves as fraud on these admittees by setting them up for failure, but 
it also constitutes a type of financial fraud on able students: 
 [W]hile some scholarships are financed through law school 
endowments, most are cross-subsidies by incoming 
students: Student A pays full tuition—largely financed 
through loans—so that student B can receive a 
discount . . . . Because of this system of variable tuition, 
some students graduate with little or no debt. A much larger 
group graduates with considerable debt.151 
Finally, these programs constitute a fraud on the taxpaying 
public that subsidizes these institutions because taxpayers believe 
that they are funding highly qualified admittees, which is not always 
the case. 
As such, I propose that Congress require the disclosure of 
admissions statistics for institutions of higher education that receive 
federal funding152: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE 
This Act may be cited as the “Openness in Higher 
Education Act of 2013.” 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS 
Citizens and taxpayers have a right to know whether 
federally supported institutions of higher education are 
treating student applications differently depending on a 
student’s membership in particular cohorts or groups and, if 
so, the consequences to the student applicants of doing so. 
SECTION 3. REPORT 
(1) Institutions of higher education that receive federal 
support shall report as follows— 
 
 151. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra, at 46; see Sander, supra note 97, at 912–13 (discussing 
transparency of law school data regarding likelihood of graduation and employment opportunities 
upon graduation, if attained). 
 152. This proposal is based on a bill that was introduced in the Arkansas legislature. See H.B. 
2216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us 
/assembly/2009/R/Bills/HB2216.pdf. 
  
Fall 2012] FOUR EASY PIECES 201 
 
Beginning October 1, 2013, and each year thereafter, each 
institution of higher education that receives federal support 
shall provide annually to the United States Department of 
Education, the Senate and House Committees on Education, 
and the public a report regarding its student admissions 
process that shall include: 
(A) A statement of whether legacy status, athletics, association 
with governmental (including school) officials, regional 
location, religion, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, gender, 
sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status are considered in 
the student admissions process; and 
(B) Which department or departments within the institution, if 
any, have separate admission processes that consider legacy 
status, association with governmental (including school) 
officials, regional location, religion, race, color, ethnicity, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic 
status in the student admissions process. 
If an institution of higher education or a department 
thereof considers legacy status, athletics, association with 
governmental (including school) officials, regional location, 
religion, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, or socioeconomic status in the student admission 
process, the institution of higher education shall provide in the 
report described in subdivision (1)(A) of this section the 
following information: 
(i) How such group membership is: 
(a) Determined; 
(b) Used to meet targets, goals, or quotas; and 
(c) Weighted; 
(ii) Why such group membership is considered, including 
the determination of the critical mass level and 
relationship to the particular institution’s education 
mission with respect to the diversity rationale; 
(iii) What consideration has been given to neutral 
alternatives as a means for achieving the same goals for 
which such group membership is considered; 
(iv) How frequently: 
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(a) The need to consider such group membership is 
reassessed; and 
(b) The reassessment is conducted; 
(v) Factors other than legacy status, association with 
governmental (including school) officials, regional 
location, religion, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status that 
are collected in the admissions process by institutions of 
higher education, including grades, class rank in previous 
degree-conferring institutions, standardized test scores, 
state residency, and other quantifiable criteria. 
(a) If such factors are collected, all raw admissions 
data for applicants regarding these factors with the 
legacy status, association with governmental 
(including school) officials, regional location, 
religion, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, 
and the admissions decision made by the institution 
regarding that applicant, shall accompany the report 
in computer-readable form with the names of 
individual students redacted but with appropriate 
links so that it is possible to determine through 
statistical analysis the weight given to legacy status, 
association with governmental (including school) 
officials, regional location, religion, race, color, 
ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
or socioeconomic status relative to other factors. 
(vi) Analysis, relative to other groups, of whether there is 
a correlation between any group membership and: 
(a) Likelihood of admission; 
(b) Likelihood of enrollment in a remediation 
prvacogram; 
(c) Likelihood of graduation; and 
(d) Likelihood of defaulting on education loans. 
(2) The Secretary shall report to the appropriate committees 
of Congress each institution of higher education that the 
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Secretary determines is not in compliance with the reporting 
requirements of this subsection. 
(3) Upon a determination that an institution of higher 
education is not in compliance with the reporting 
requirements of this subsection, has de-identified any data 
so as to remove any of the information required to be 
reported by this Act, and/or has misrepresented its data, the 
Secretary shall impose a civil penalty upon the institution as 
follows: 
(A) The Secretary shall impose a civil penalty upon such 
institution of an amount not to exceed $50,000 for each 
violation or misrepresentation. 
(B) Any civil penalty may be compromised by the Secretary. In 
determining the amount agreed upon in compromise, the 
Secretary shall consider the appropriateness of the penalty to 
the size of the educational institution, the gravity of the 
violation, and any failure, omission, or misrepresentation. The 
amount agreed upon in compromise may be deducted from any 
sums owed by the United States to the institution charged. 
(4) Any reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of 
this section shall also satisfy the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA) for the purposes of meeting the 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds pursuant thereto. 
Any attempt to de-identify records that results in a report 
that does not fully respond to the requirements of this Act 
shall constitute a violation of both this section and FERPA, 
subjecting the violator to the penalties set forth herein and 
the withholding of funds by the Secretary of Education 
pursuant to FERPA. 
VI.  JUDGING UNIVERSITY 
QUALITY AND VALUE 
In addition to analyzing admissions data, the public—including 
potential paying students—seeks data regarding the value of 
obtaining a degree from any particular public institution of higher 
learning. Indeed, this issue has rocketed in importance among 
students considering how to invest their limited resources in this 
beleaguered economy. 
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For example, students and taxpayers rightly consider academic 
credentials of incoming classes and employment opportunities for 
graduating classes in deciding whether to contribute to those 
institutions—be it through tuition, donation, or public funds. Yet 
again, the University of Illinois—in events unrelated directly to the 
various above-mentioned events—caught the public’s attention: 
The University of Illinois . . . launched an investigation 
into whether the school inflated test scores and grades when 
describing the profile of this fall’s incoming class. 
The possible inaccuracies come two years after an 
admissions scandal over the university admitting subpar 
politically connected students over more qualified 
applicants. Some of the most egregious examples were in 
the College of Law. 
The latest concern is whether median law school test 
scores and grade-point averages of the most recent class 
“may have been inaccurately reported” on the school’s 
website and in promotional materials. . . . [U]niversity 
officials have not confirmed whether the information was 
inflated intentionally. . . . A report by the state’s 
Admissions Review Commission, appointed in the wake of 
the Tribune reports, criticized the Law school for leaving all 
decision-making authority to the admissions dean instead of 
including faculty in applicant reviews as it had done in the 
past.153 
Two scholars have gone so far as to suggest that several law 
schools, their deans, U.S. News and World Report (U.S. News), and 
its employees may have committed felonies by manipulating or even 
 
 153. Jodi S. Cohen, U of I Law School Admission’s Dean on Leave as Test Scores 
Investigated, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 12, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-12/news/chi 
-uof-i-law-school-admissions-dean-on-leave-as-test-scores-investigated-20110912_1_admissions 
-scandal-admissions-dean-admissions-irregularities; see also Morgan Cloud & George Shepherd, 
Law Deans in Jail 4 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
12-199, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990746 (“In 2011, for example, Villanova 
University and the University of Illinois both announced that for several years they had produced 
and submitted false information about their law students’ median undergraduate grade point 
averages (GPAs) and LSAT test scores, both important components of the U.S. News formula. 
Six years earlier, the Dean of the University of Illinois College of Law confessed publicly that for 
years the school had lied about the school's expenditures. These all appear to be examples of 
falsehoods that could constitute mail and wire fraud.”). 
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falsifying data to improve their rankings.154 “[O]ther schools appear 
to have constructed schemes designed to ‘game’ the U.S. News 
methodology by submitting information that arguably was ‘true’ but 
was so partial or incomplete that it created a deceptive picture of the 
institution, its students, and their job prospects after graduation.”155 
As a consequence of this alleged deception, several law school 
graduates from different schools have initiated legal challenges 
against their former educational institutions for misrepresenting their 
postgraduation employment opportunities.156 For example, a 2008 
honors graduate of Thomas Jefferson School of Law in California 
sued her former school claiming that the law school actively 
misrepresented her post–law school job prospects.157 
The number of lawsuits accusing law schools of 
“legerdemain” in their claims about post-graduate 
employment has quintupled. [In addition to] . . .Thomas M. 
Cooley Law School . . . , New York Law School and 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law . . . [graduates have sued] 
Albany Law, Brooklyn Law, Hofstra Law, Widener Law, 
Florida Coastal, Chicago-Kent, DePaul Law, John Marshall 
Law School, California Western, Southwestern, USF Law 
and Golden Gate. The lawsuits seek tuition refunds.158 
“‘Our goal is to sue 20 to 25 more schools every few months,’” 
the plaintiffs’ attorney said.159 And that project intends to pursue 
both public and private schools for any misrepresentations.160 
 
 154. Cloud & Shepherd, supra note 153, at 4–7. 
 155. Id. at 4. 
 156. See Chi. Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Ill. Bd. of Trs., 781 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
vacated on other grounds, 680 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2012); Karen Sloan, Another 15 Law Schools 
Targeted over Jobs Data, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.law.com/ jsp/nlj/ 
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202517930210&slreturn=1; Brian Tamanaha, Prospective Students 
Deserve Straightforward Law School Data, NAT’L JURIST (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/prospective-students-deserve-straightforward-law-school 
-data; see also Cohen, supra note 153; Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 104. 
 157. Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 104; Martha Neil, Honors Grad Working as Doc Reviewer 
Sues Law School, Says She Was Misled by US News Stats, A.B.A. J. (May 27, 2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/honors_grad_working_as_doc_reviewer_sues_law 
_school_says_she_was_misled_by_/. 
 158. Joe Palazzolo, A Dozen Law Schools Hit with Lawsuits over Jobs Data, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/01/a-dozen-law-schools-hit 
-with-lawsuits-over-jobs-data/?blog_id=14&post_id=41838. 
 159. Id. (quoting attorney David Anziska). 
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This alleged fraud, if real, has real consequences in the context 
of public education: wasted student money, missed student 
opportunities, squandered taxpayer funds, and the exploitation of 
students and citizens by educational institutions pursuing self-interest 
over public good.161 
High levels of student debt have been shown to impact the 
student and the public in three main ways. These are: (1) 
the financial burden on the individual; (2) the expense of 
loan subsidies to taxpayers; and (3) the negative effect of 
defaults on the individual and the taxpayer. Simply put, an 
individual facing the burden of a large debt does not have 
disposable income, and therefore, the individual is less 
likely to make purchases or save.162 
In a dataset studied by one academic, only “52 percent of bar-
failers were working full-time compared to 74 percent of first-time 
passers . . . . Results from a logistic regression indicate that failing 
the bar exam has an independent effect on full-time employment, 
even when controls for law school grades and other measures of 
ability are included.”163 Of course, the costs of this fraud are largely 
borne by students, and loans are often made to students who are 
unable to repay them due to their own financial situations coupled 
with the too-often disguised, and unsatisfactory, value of the 
particular institution’s degree: 
The Education Department does not make lending 
decisions based on credit scores . . . . Nor does it conduct a 
rigorous analysis on how graduation from particular 
 
 160. See Jack Crittenden, 12 More Law Schools Sued Over Employment Data, NAT'L JURIST, 
May 2012, http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/12-more-law-schools-sued-over-employment 
-data. 
 161. See Auster, supra note 141, at 104 (discussing for-profit colleges and their frequent use 
of federal funding). 
 162. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 99. 
 163. Yakowitz, supra note 93, at 28, 31 (“But after a protracted adjustment period (spanning 
ten years or more), never-passers seem to bounce back. Though they never catch up with lawyers, 
the average never-passer surpasses the trajectory of average college graduates their age. The 
recovery is encouraging news. After all, the average bar-failer would not necessarily live the life 
of an average lawyer if he had passed the bar exam, so the partial closing of the gap during the 
mid-career years suggests that the short-term costs of bar failure are much heftier than the long-
term ones. But evidence that bar-failers are resilient is not the same as evidence that they avoided 
significant costs. Law students come from the ranks of the nation's strongest college graduates. 
Any period of time spent struggling in the labor market warrants concern.”). 
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institutions affects an individual’s income or earning power. 
The protections for the U.S. Treasury are largely on the 
back end: Changes to the federal bankruptcy code over the 
last 15 years have made it extremely difficult to discharge 
student debt.164 
One academic noted the effects of this phenomenon: 
If we don’t change the economics of legal education, 
not only will law schools continue to graduate streams of 
economic casualties each year, but we will also be erecting 
an enormous barrier to access to the legal profession: the 
next generation of American lawyers will consist of the 
offspring of wealthy families who have the freedom to 
pursue a variety of legal careers, while everyone else is 
forced to try to get a corporate law job—and those who fail 
will struggle under the burden of huge law school debt for 
decades.165 
And a story presented on the Reader Supported News website 
describes a former law student’s realization of the consequences of 
this economic model: 
As Brian Tamanaha, a law professor at Washington 
University Law in St. Louis, says, “My book vindicates the 
basic view of the scambloggers that attending law school is 
a highly risky proposition that turns out badly for many 
students, who end up with a huge debt and no law job”—or 
any job, for that matter, that generates enough income to 
manage the debt.” 
. . . . 
It isn’t hard to find student debtors who feel like 
they’ve been crushed by the system. At 47, John Koch is 
still living with his elderly parents in Oyster Bay, Long 
Island. Although he has a law degree, Koch has earned a 
living as a house painter for many years. 
. . . . 
 
 164. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 46, at 33; Steinbuch, supra note 14, at 71–72, 99. 
 165. Brian Tamanaha, Op.-Ed., How to Make Law School Affordable, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/how-to-make-law-school-affordable.html?_r 
=3&hp. 
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Koch originally borrowed $69,000 in 1997. The 
majority of that money was loans for law school, 
seemingly, he says, to “better myself.” After he graduated 
from Touro Law School, Koch struggled to find steady 
employment and eventually he defaulted on his loans. He 
was immediately slapped with $50,000 in penalties. For 
years, he had been filling out deferment forms every six 
months to buy himself more time but in 2009, Sallie Mae 
declared him in default. At the time of this writing, Koch 
owes over $320,000. That sounds staggering but it’s hardly 
unusual. Once a person defaults on a student loan, the 
balance grows exponentially, with interest compounding on 
interest, penalties and fees. By the time he “retires,” in 23 
years, Koch figures he will owe close to $1.9 million. He 
can’t get even subprime credit, he tells me, and it’s not like 
there’s any way out of his trap: student loan debt cannot be 
absolved through bankruptcy. 
Koch struggles with suicidal thoughts and admits to 
self-destructive behavior, such as heavy drinking and 
cigarettes. Eventually he channeled those feelings into a 
blog that draws more readers each month. In January of 
2012, though, the Suffolk County police paid his parents an 
unpleasant visit to inquire about their son’s suicidal 
comments and posts. 
. . . . 
I spoke to Koch a few months ago while he walked his 
dog and smoked a cigarette. He described his life as pretty 
much over, and he echoed that sentiment a few weeks ago. 
“So much for achieving the American Dream.” These days, 
Koch watches as the interest piles up. He sighs when we 
hang up, and says, “I mean, why punish the debtor with 
greater debt?”166 
“[T]he available information suggests that, if law school 
bestowed a benefit to . . . never-passers at all, it didn’t begin to pay 
dividends until the later half of their careers, and likely couldn’t ‘pay 
 
 166. C. Cryn Johanssen, Student Loan Debt Suicides, READER SUPPORTED NEWS (July 4, 
2012), http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/279-82/12236-focus-student-loan-debt-suicides. 
  
Fall 2012] FOUR EASY PIECES 209 
 
back’ the harms that the law school experience seemed to have 
caused during the first half.”167 
The current approach to student loans creates a perverse 
incentive, wherein schools being paid through student loans have no 
skin in the game regarding their enticement of students to their 
schools. Having not made the student loans directly, the schools bear 
no cost for misrepresenting the likelihood that students will graduate 
and that those who do will get jobs. As such, the schools remain free 
from financial responsibility for admitting students who the schools 
know are unlikely to succeed therein or thereafter.168 
The assistant director for servicemember affairs at the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has railed against predatory 
 
 167. Yakowitz, supra note 93, at 39. 
 168. See Kevin Carey, Here's a Diploma, With Ball and Chain Attached, THE CHRON. 
HIGHER ED. (June 18, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Heres-a-Diploma-With-Ball/132309 
/?cid=wb&utm_ source= wb&utm_medium=en (“[A] higher-education system that depends on 
hundreds of thousands of 18-year-olds making wise choices about money is a system designed to 
produce widespread financial catastrophe. Borrowing $120,000 for a garden-variety bachelor's 
degree is folly, and colleges that allow or encourage students to make such choices are morally 
culpable for the consequences.”); Alex J. Pollock, Fixing Student Loans: Let’s Give Colleges 
Some ‘Skin in the Game’, THE AMERICAN (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.american.com 
/archive/2012/january/fixing-student-loans-lets-give-the-colleges-some-skin-in-the-game (“Who 
are the most important parties to have ‘skin in the game’ in student loans? The colleges 
themselves, of course! They are the effective originators, the promoters, and the chief financial 
beneficiaries of student loans. It is their rising costs which result in ever more debt and more risk 
of default for student borrowers and for taxpayers.”); Student Loan Experts Call for Increased 
Responsibility, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (June 15, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com 
/quicktakes/2012/06/15/student-loan-experts-call-increased-responsibility#ixzz1y0pqxN9z (“The 
refrain of the discussion—that higher education institutions need to have ‘skin in the game’ by 
paying a penalty when their students default on loans—is a familiar one in discussions of how to 
keep colleges from reaping all of the benefits and none of the costs of high tuition rates. [Richard] 
George [CEO of the Great Lakes Higher Education Corporation] also proposed that ‘vulnerable 
cohorts,’ students more likely to drop out of college and default on their student loans, should not 
be allowed to borrow until they have demonstrated academic persistence toward finishing a 
degree; until that point, colleges should carry the cost burden for students. He said if colleges 
participated in this campaign that their ‘skin in the game’ would carry less risk, as students more 
likely to default on their loans would have been weeded out before being allowed to borrow. 
[Former Secretary of Education William] Bennett said it’s time to subject higher education to the 
same level of scrutiny given to K-12 education: ‘It’s time to look at the whole enterprise of higher 
education,’ he said. ‘I expect resistance to that, but the questions are there, and more are 
coming.’”). Other scholars suggest cutting off federal funding of student loans when students are 
unable to repay their loans. See Tamanaha, supra note 156 (“To restore some economic 
rationality, the federal loan system needs to demand greater accountability from law schools: 
those with a high proportion of recent graduates in financial trouble should lose their eligibility to 
receive money from federal loans. (A similar requirement is currently applied to for-profit 
colleges.)”). 
  
210 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:163 
 
practices by for-profit educational institutions when perpetrated 
against military personnel: “[military] families are . . . under 
siege . . . . A number of these schools focus on members of the 
armed forces with aggressive and often misleading marketing, and 
then provide little academic, administrative or counseling support 
once the students are enrolled.”169 In a related phenomenon, “[t]he 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is . . . scrutin[izing] . . . 
lenders to students at profit-making colleges . . . that have high rates 
of default . . . . The director . . . compared the practices of some parts 
of the student loan business to those of the subprime mortgage 
lending machine that contributed to the financial crisis.”170 While 
this latter effort only addresses the supply of cheap capital, not the 
demand generated by misrepresentations of the institutions seeking 
that money, it serves as an additional tool to address the costs of 
improper inducement. 
And President Obama recently signed an executive order forcing 
higher-education institutions to disclose more information regarding 
financial aid and graduation rates.171 The order applies to all 
colleges, though it seemingly focused on for-profit schools.172 The 
largest for-profit college association expressed disappointment over 
the executive order.173 
Regarding law schools in particular, “a new report by Law 
School Transparency, a non-profit organization, shows that 38 
percent of law schools are ‘misleading’ prospective students on their 
websites when it comes to salary information, and a majority are 
 
 169. Hollister K. Petraeus, For-Profit Colleges, Vulnerable G.I.’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/opinion/for-profit-colleges-vulnerable-gis.html?scp 
=2&sq=holly%20petraeus&st=cse; see also Carey, supra note 168 (“Who's to blame? In 
Washington, much of the chatter has been about for-profit colleges that load students with debt in 
exchange for worthless degrees. And some for-profits, although not all, deserve blame and tighter 
regulation. But the entire for-profit industry enrolls only 10 percent of students. Most of that 
$1-trillion was borrowed at traditional nonprofit colleges.”). 
 170. Edward Wyatt, Some Lenders to Students Face Greater U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/business/consumer-agency-sees-problems 
-in-student-loan-business.html?_r=1. 
 171. Libby A. Nelson, GI Bill™, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.inside 
highered.com/news/2012/04/27/obama-issues-executive-order-veterans-recruiting. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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doing a substandard job with all employment data.”174 The American 
Bar Association (ABA) has taken a timid first step to address some 
of these deficiencies as they relate to law schools. The ABA initially 
proposed new rules for accreditation that would require 
law schools to post far more detailed consumer information 
on their websites than they are required to now, including 
bar passage rates and employment outcomes for graduates 
by job status and employment type. Law schools also would 
be required to disclose conditional scholarship retention 
data, including the number of students admitted under such 
scholarships over a three-year period and the number of 
students whose scholarships were subsequently reduced or 
eliminated.175 
However, 
while [t]he ABA’s Council of the Section of Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar . . . gave preliminary 
approval to a new accreditation standard that would require 
law schools to report additional details about their 
scholarship retention rates and the jobs that their graduates 
land . . . . the council rejected a recommendation that it 
require law schools to report school-specific salary data. 
Transparency advocates said the omission would leave 
prospective students without important information about 
their earnings prospects.176 
Even for law schools, this may not be enough. I propose an 
alternative approach that I believe will have the most effect and will 
apply to virtually all schools: force schools to assume financial 
responsibility for their actions and assertions. 
Institutions of higher education rely on taxpayer funds, 
regardless of whether they are public or private. Virtually all 
veritable higher-education schools either receive direct government 
 
 174. Elizabeth Ewing, Are Law Schools Failing When it Comes to Employment 
Transparency?, 21 NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2012, at 20–21, available at http://www.nxtbook.com 
/nxtbooks/cypress/nationaljurist0312/#/20. 
 175. Mark Hansen, ABA Committee Approves New Law School Disclosure Requirements, 
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 17, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_committee 
_recommends_new_law_school_disclosure_requirements/. 
 176. Karen Sloan, ABA Backs Off Making Law Schools Report Graduates’ Salaries, NAT’L J. 
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202546229913&slreturn=1. 
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funding through grants and public financing or accept students 
whose tuition is supplemented with federally guaranteed student 
loans. 
Notably, “[t]otal student debt outstanding topped $1 trillion late 
last year. . . . That’s significantly more than what [Americans] owe 
on credit cards and car loans.”177 And these loans are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.178 
Yet, some of these educational institutions benefitting from 
government-backed nondischargeable student loans either 
misrepresent or fail to disclose critical data about themselves—such 
as admission data and likelihood of finding postgraduation 
employment. As such, I propose that Congress revise the Bankruptcy 
Code to ensure that debtors and creditors are protected from the 
fraudulent actions of educational institutions that receive federal 
funds or loans guaranteed or funded, in part or whole, by a 
governmental unit: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Bankruptcy Code Revision 
Act of 2013.” 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS. 
(1) Educational institutions are harming students and the 
public when they admit students who are likely to fail, 
without disclosing that information to the students, while 
seeking and accepting their tuition and other financial 
payments; 
(2) Educational institutions are harming students and the 
public when they admit students who are unlikely to obtain 
appropriate in-field employment upon graduation from, 
and/or completion of, the educational institution’s program, 
or thereafter, that would reasonably allow for the repayment 
of any loan, funds, scholarship, or stipend that the student is 
obligated to repay, without disclosing that information to 
the students, while seeking and accepting their tuition and 
other financial payments. 
 
 177. Melissa Korn, The Burden of Student Loans, WALL ST. J. JUGGLE BLOG, (Mar. 22, 2012, 
12:31 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2012/03/22/the-burden-of-student-loans/. 
 178. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006). 
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SECTION 3. PROMOTING THE INTEGRITY OF 
FEDERAL FUNDING OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
BY ASSURING OVERSIGHT. 
(1) Amendments to 11 U.S.C. 523. 
(A) 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is amended by striking its language 
and replacing it with: 
“(8)(A) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this 
paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and 
the debtor’s dependents, for— 
(i)(a) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made 
under any program funded in whole or in part by a 
governmental unit or nonprofit institution; 
(b) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or 
(ii) any other educational loan that is a qualified education 
loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an 
individual; 
(B) An undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 
dependents shall exist, inter alia, if the debtor’s obligation to 
repay any loan, funds, scholarship, or stipend referred to herein 
was induced, in part or whole, by the failure to disclose, or a 
negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, by the educational 
institution that was the beneficiary of that loan, funds, 
scholarship, or stipend, the debtor’s likelihood of— 
(i) graduating from, and/or completing, the educational 
institution’s program; 
(ii) obtaining appropriate in-field employment upon 
graduation from, and/or completion of, the educational 
institution’s program, or thereafter; or 
(iii) obtaining appropriate in-field employment upon 
graduation from, and/or completion of, the educational 
institution’s program, or thereafter, that would reasonably 
allow for the repayment of any loan, funds, scholarship, 
or stipend referred to herein. 
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(C) A finding of undue hardship under subsection (B) shall 
entitle the creditor whose debt is being discharged to seek 
damages from the educational institution that was the 
beneficiary of that loan, funds, scholarship, or stipend, for any 
State and/or federal claims that it and/or the debtor has, or 
would have, as a result of the omission, or negligent or 
fraudulent misrepresentation, by the educational institution 
referred to in subsection (B), including any claims established 
herein. Nothing in this subsection shall limit any State or 
federal rights possessed by the debtor or creditors. 
(D) Subsection (B) shall not imply the absence in law of 
additional bases to establish undue hardship under 
subsection (A).” 
VII.  FUNDING DECISIONS 
AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS 
The public also uses public-access laws to investigate whether 
taxpayer moneys are properly managed. This is exemplified by the 
scandal in the Penn State football program. Such programs receive 
public funds. Yet, they fall short of meeting the public’s expectations 
of propriety and openness. These types of hidden wrongdoings are 
often exposed through investigations into not the wrongdoing itself, 
but rather the expenditure of state funds to compensate victims of 
such misconduct. For this reason, inter alia, state laws typically 
encourage the disclosure of settlements. 
For example, the Illinois FOIA provides that “[a]ll settlement 
agreements entered into by or on behalf of a public body are public 
records subject to inspection and copying by the public, provided 
that information exempt from disclosure under Section 7 of this Act 
may be redacted.”179 Moreover, that FOIA requires that “[a]ll records 
relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the 
State, units of local government, and school districts are public 
records subject to inspection and copying by the public.”180 
 
 179. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2.20 (2012). 
 180. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2.5 (2012); accord 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2.10 
(West 2012) (requiring that certified payroll records submitted to public bodies under the 
Prevailing Wage Act are open); In re FOIA, Ill. Public Access Opinion No. 11-004 (Apr. 15, 
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Likewise, state constitutions will sometimes makes clear that public 
funds—regardless of how they are packaged—are open: “Reports 
and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of 
the . . . units of local government . . . are public records available for 
inspection by the public.”181 
The University of Illinois–Springfield (UIS) did not internalize 
this legislative and constitutional requirement for openness. The 
State Journal-Register sought from UIS a name-redacted version of a 
“letter from an attorney who represented a student-athlete who was 
paid $200,000 to settle allegations of inappropriate behavior by 
former coaches of the women’s softball team.”182 UIS refused and 
the State Journal-Register sought an opinion from the Illinois 
Attorney General (AG).183 The AG agreed generally with the 
newspaper that the letter was a matter for the public to examine 
under the FOIA.184 Thereafter, “[t]he university turned the letter over 
to the newspaper in January . . . but redacted the entire contents 
except for addressees, the date it was written and the title: ‘Sexual 
Assault and Battery by UIS Softball Coach.’”185 This occurred 
notwithstanding that the newspaper “never sought the names of 
students” or took issue with the attorney general’s ruling that “the 
name of the student who received the money and any information, 
such as her year in school, that could identify her should not be 
released.”186 
The timeline of the UIS events provides a dramatic illustration 
of the problem of university obfuscation and obduracy: in March 
2009, allegations of assault and impropriety by certain coaches of the 
women’s softball team prompted a university investigation; later in 
March, the UIS Chancellor asked for and received resignations from 
the coaches; in May 2009, the State Journal-Register requested the 
documents concerning these events; in June, UIS refused to comply; 
on September 8, 2009, the university paid $200,000 to a member of 
 
2011); In re FOIA, Ill. Public Access Opinion No. 10-004 (Dec. 29, 2010); see generally In re 
FOIA, Ill. Public Access Opinion No. 11-0045 (Apr. 18, 2011) (interpreting the Illinois FOIA). 
 181. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c). 
 182. Rushton, supra note 30. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. 
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the women’s softball team to settle these claims; on January 4, 2010, 
the State Journal-Register filed another records request because 
Illinois’s new Freedom of Information Act went into effect that day; 
on September 30, 2010, the Attorney General instructed UIS that the 
records are public; on October 1, 2010, UIS baldly refused to release 
the records despite the Attorney General’s advisory opinion; that 
same day, the newspaper raised the university’s decision with the 
Attorney General; on January 6, 2011, the AG instructed UIS that it 
must give the newspaper copies of the settlement agreement and the 
March 23, 2009 letter from the attorney of one of the players 
outlining the accusations against the coaches; on January 7, 2011, the 
newspaper requested the AG to order UIS to disclose the redacted 
portion of the 2009 letter; on March 8, 2011, the AG instructed UIS 
that the redactions are not allowed; nonetheless, the university did 
not make the letter public.187 
UIS’s implacability was noted by the AG: its spokesperson said 
that UIS “steadfastly refuses to comply fully and completely with 
[Freedom of Information Act] laws and to supply the public with 
documents it knows are public”188 Equally, “[s]he said the U. of I. is 
among the agencies that ‘repeatedly disobey the law.’”189 The 
public’s outrage about the university’s misdeeds and failure to 
disclose them are also reflected in the comment section on the State 
Journal-Register’s webpage.190 Illinois’s relatively high-caliber 
press, new FOIA, and surprisingly intransigent public-education 
institutions result in the perfect storm of FOIA anecdotes. 
A separate but related situation presents itself when universities 
enter into settlement agreements containing confidentiality clauses. 
Such clauses provide an understandable allure, since they allow 
universities to avoid disclosing details associated with alleged 
wrongdoing of school officials. However, confidential settlement 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Jodi S. Cohen & David Kidwell, Attorney General Aide: U. of I. Flouting Law, CHI. 
TRIB. (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/education/ct-met-foia-attorney 
-general-universi20110402,0,7461991.story (alteration in original) (quoting Ann Spillane, Chief 
of Staff, Illinois Attorney General’s Office). 
 189. Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. See Comments to UIS Continues to Resist Disclosure of Coaches' Conduct, ST. J. REG. 
(Mar. 17, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1777814658/UIS-continues-to 
-resist-disclosure-of-coaches-conduct. 
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agreements are also plainly inconsistent with the public’s expectation 
of openness and transparency—if not the language of the state 
FOIAs designed to protect those expectations. For this reason, noted 
FOIA expert Richard Peltz-Steele, who was himself a party to a 
confidential settlement agreement with his former university 
employer—presumably at the university’s request—lamented the use 
of confidential clauses by public institutions in Arkansas: 
Not only do I think that Arkansas public institutions should 
not enter into settlement agreements that contain 
confidentiality clauses, as that frustrates the spirit, if not the 
language of, the FOIA, I believe that the purpose of the 
FOIA is best served by having all settlement agreements 
with Arkansas public institutions affirmatively made public 
even without a specific request from a citizen of 
Arkansas.191 
Indeed, Professor Peltz-Steele’s position is supported by existing 
law. The federal FOIA already mandates the disclosure of certain 
documents even absent any request.192 For example, the United 
States Department of Justice provides for a “proactive disclosure 
of . . . records [that] allows you to instantly access information which 
relates to the Department’s day-to-day operations.”193 These records 
include “policy statements, staff manuals and instructions, final 
opinions and orders, which are always available without making a 
FOIA request.”194 
To be clear, the fact that university administrators may seek the 
protection of confidentiality clauses does not mean that the 
underlying allegations against them were true. But, when public-
school administrators use institutional resources to pay to resolve 
charges, such actions should be subject to the check of public 
scrutiny—a service typically provided by the judicial process, but 
supplanted through settlement. To be sure, that public accounting 
may very well result in approval, but such endorsement cannot be 
assumed ex ante. 
 
 191. Interview with Richard Peltz-Steele, Dartmouth, MA (Nov. 23, 2011). 
 192. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
 193. Available Documents for OIP, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/oip 
_foia1.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 194. Id. 
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Educational institutions that receive federal funds or loans, 
guaranteed or funded, in part or whole, by a governmental unit, are 
subjected to varying state FOIAs but generally not covered by the 
federal FOIA. As such, these schools owe inconsistent 
responsibilities to the national public, notwithstanding that they rely 
on federal funds. Some states, like Pennsylvania, maintain gaping 
holes in the applicability of their FOIAs to public institutions of 
higher education. Additionally, some state FOIAs only require public 
schools to respond to requests from citizens of their states 
notwithstanding that these schools might receive funding from 
taxpayers throughout the country. Similarly, schools in some states 
might be entitled to invoke exemptions to state FOIAs not 
permissible in other states, which results in different disclosure 
obligations for institutions receiving the same federal taxpayer 
funding. Legislation that subjects federally supported state schools to 
the federal FOIA will address this problem. 
I propose that Congress revise the federal FOIA for the purpose 
of preventing educational institutions that receive federal funding 
from improperly restricting access to relevant data by the public: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “FOIA Revision Act of 2013.” 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS. 
The public has a right to know how federally supported 
institutions of higher education operate. Nonetheless, 
institutions receiving federal funding have refused, and 
continue to refuse, to respond to legitimate requests under 
state freedom of information acts. 
SEC. 3. PROMOTING THE INTEGRITY OF FEDERAL FUNDING 
OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BY ASSURING OVERSIGHT. 
(1). Amendments to FOIA. 
(A) 5 USC § 551 is amended by inserting after “(1)‘agency’ 
means each authority of the Government of the United 
States,” the following language: 
“or any higher educational institution that accepts and/or 
receives direct federal funding in an amount in excess of 
$100,000 annually,” 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have offered four easy pieces to correct the 
imbalance between confidentiality and accountability currently 
present in publicly financed higher education. These legislative 
solutions will not only allow scholars and others to pursue important 
research while properly protecting individual privacy; more 
importantly, these four easy pieces will provide for greater public 
oversight of taxpayer-funded institutions. However, while these 
solutions may be easy in terms of how they correct the described 
problems, I fear that self-interested politics may make the actual 
adoption of these changes not so simple. 
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